A Bridge Not Far, Monty's Operation Market Garden sabotaged?

[TonyGosling]

The Traitors of Arnhem?
http://www.911forum.org.uk/board/cal_lite.php?id=1262&mode=display&cl_ d=22&cl_m=09&cl_y=2018
Exploding the myths of Operation Market Garden with UK journalist Tony Gosling
http://kreekoosterbeek.nl/event/seminar-the-traitors-of-arnhem/

4pm, Saturday 22 September 2018
Kreek Oosterbeek, Weverstraat 24, 6862 DP Oosterbeek, Holland



How did the Nazis find out the paratroopers were coming?
Who gave permission for a former SS officer to help plan Operation Market Garden?
How did a Dutch-born British army counter-intelligence officer nearly save the day?
Who really cut the wires and stopped the Nazis blowing up Nijmegen bridge?
Why did 100 British tanks, which could have relieved Arnhem and the Oosterbeek 'Hexenkessel', grind to a halt in Lent?
Where did around $1bn the Nazis had looted from European bank vaults disappear to at the end of WWII?
Which Germans came to the first Bilderberg hotel meeting a decade later in 1954?
What have the consequences of losing in Arnhem been for the post-war world?
74 years on, what has come to light about the real heroes and villains of Nijmegen and Arnhem?

Winston Churchill said "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." For seventy five years we have been taught Operation Market Garden, British commander Montgomery's plan to liberate Holland, was a badly conceived mission, doomed to fail. British journalist Tony Gosling begs to differ, he believes the battle of Arnhem was deliberately sabotaged to prolong the war on the Western front, by treacherous anti-Soviet elements in the British Establishment.

Around 80,000 allied soldiers and airmen took part in what is still the biggest airborne operation in history. The consequences were catastrophic for the allied armed forces but worse for the Dutch civilian population. In the subsequent 'Hongerwinter', after the Germans cut off all food supplies to the Arnhem region, an estimated 22,000 Dutch civilians were starved to death. The week-long battle resulted in around 2,500 dead soldiers on each side, roughly 7,000 German and 15,000 allied casualties in total, while 6,500 British paratroopers were taken prisoner.

In this audio-visual seminar the former BBC journalist will present evidence that, after August 1944, senior collaborators within the British state were doing secret deals with high-ranking Nazis for enriched uranium, gold and money, in exchange for safe passage and new identities after the war. He goes on to explain how two key figures who made decisive 'blunders' at Operation Market Garden were rewarded with top jobs after the war in political lobbying for corporate cartels, the EEC, eventually the EU and Euro currency too, in the NATO countries.
The Oosterbeek-founded Bilderberg lobby Bernhard and Carrington chaired were also accused in 2010, by Italy's most senior judge, Ferdinando Imposimato, of working for international organised crime. Of using far right agents in the NATO intelligence structures to kill hundreds of European citizens in 'Gladio' terrorist attacks, from the 1970s to 1990s, which they tried to blame on Moscow.

We will hear from other speakers about the September 1944 battle, the subsequent Bilderberg conferences and the lessons to learn for the anti-war movement today. Then, after 'the Grenadier Guards Lent tea break', it's 'open mic', where anyone who wishes to can give a contribution on Market Garden, Bilderberg and related topics for up to ten minutes. We close at 1900.

The entire seminar will be filmed and we hope to make it available afterwards online.

Contact Tony Gosling +44 7786 952037 tony@cultureshop.org.uk

[TonyGosling]

Re the seminar
David just sent me this by email

PRINCES OF PLUNDER
http://www.deepblacklies.co.uk/princes_of_plunder_pr.htm

THE SHAPE OF TREACHERY AND THE BRIDGE AT ARNHEM

By David Guyatt

If President George W Bush has his way, then the spread of the American system of democracy will continue to proliferate around the world. There are those, however, who argue that the American form of “democracy” has little to do with genuine democratic representation but rather more closely resembles a revolving fascist dictatorship beholden to the interests of a wealthy elite and big business. [1]

This form of government, it is argued, has as its underlying model the European Synarchist movement that was founded in the 1870’s, by Joseph Alexandre Saint-Yves d'Alveydre. St Yves considered the medieval Knights Templars to be ultimate Synarchists of their time and consequently drew on Templar ideals when formulating his ideas.

St Yves movement came to the fore in the early 1920’s, following the end of WWI and the signing of the Versailles Treaty [2] . In its essence, Synarchy advocates that government be run by a secret society or cabal – “an elite of enlightened initiates who rule from behind the scenes.” [3] As authors Lynn Picknett and Clive Prince describe it: “…it therefore doesn't matter which political party holds power in a state - or even what political system that state has. Synarchists would step in and take control of the key state institutions.” [4]

In the United States, one such secret society worthy of note is Yale University’s Order of the Skull and Bones. Entry into the Order involves elaborate ritual and is accompanied by a change of name. No longer is the neophyte known by his family name, but assumes the identity of a Knight.

Bonesmen include George W. Bush, his father George Bush senior and Senator John Kerry. George Bush’s great grandfather, Prescott Bush, was also a Bonesman, as was George Bush’s favourite uncle, Herbert Walker. In point of fact, almost all of the so-called “Eastern Establishment” families have been enrolled in the Skull and Bones. Author Antony Sutton, in his groundbreaking four-part series “The Order,” states that the US Order links to Britain through the Rhodes-Milner Oxford Group but has German origins. The US Order also links to the Guggenheim, Schiff and Warburg families, despite having definite anti-semitic tendencies until more recent times. Sutton’s own research linked the Order to “the founding and growth of Nazism” [5] and considered it likely that German original was the Illuminati.

The Bush family’s political dynasty and indeed, its wealth, arose from the nazi connections forged by Prescott Bush, who worked for nazi magnate, Fritz Thyssen. Bush’s uncle “Herbie” (Herbert Walker), was like-wise employed by Thyssen. [6] An even darker episode was reported by a Dutch intelligence agent who stated that Prescott Bush also managed a portion of the slave labour force located at I G Farben’s Auschwitz plant - the infamous nazi death camp. [7] Working for Prescott Bush was Allen Dulles, who would later become a director of the CIA, following a highly questionable career in the war where he was posted to the head up the Swiss office of the American intelligence service, the OSS. Before the war Dulles was appointed the US legal counsel for I G Farben. Another law client of Dulles was Fritz Thyssen. These inter-relationships are, at the very least, very chummy. Some believe them to be treacherous.

The key period of the growth of Synarchism followed on the heels of the Russian Revolution and led to the rise of the Pan European Movement in 1922. The PEM was embraced by powerful forces inside Germany. This included the wealthy banker, Max Warburg, who financed PEM. Warburg was a director of the massive chemical cartel, I G Farben, that helped hoist Adolf Hitler to power. Curiously, however, Warburg was also involved in helping Lenin to travel to Russia in 1917, thus providing succour to the Bolshevik Revolution that Hitler later so detested. [8] Is this simply a case of the left hand not knowing what the right one was doing, or could it be merely an example of the Hegelian dialectic of forging conflict in order to forge the future shape and direction of human history?

In any event, besides Max Warburg financing PEM, another German banker in the form of Hjalmar Schact, addressed the first mass rally of the Pan European Movement held in Berlin. Schacht would go on to work for Hitler as Minister for Economics and President of the Reichsbank. If one believes in coincidence then behold a coincidence: together with Hitler, Max Warburg signed the document that appointed Hjalmar Schacht to the presidency of the Reichsbank. Imagine that. Max’s brother, Paul Warburg, was a director of American I G Farben as well as being the first director of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [9]

Known simply as the “AO” – the letters of the Greek Alpha-Omega – the “Auslandsorganisation” was the foreign intelligence arm of the nazi party that engaged in espionage, fifth column, propaganda and “economic” activities in furtherance of nazi aims. Overseas members of the AO operated largely through German owned or controlled overseas companies. This include numerous employees of I G Farben both those based at home and abroad. In fact, Farben not only ran the AO but financed it. [10] One of the most senior Farben men involved in AO activities was Max Ilgner, who was the nephew of Farben director Hermann Schmitz – who’s ambition was to “form a world fascist state without war if possible.” [11]

Ilgner, who was a uniform wearing member of the feared Gestapo, had allied Farben’s intelligence unit known as “NW7” with the AO, and had recruited an army of 5,000 that operated through American I.G. [12] Another member of Farben’s NW7 department, was Gunther Frank-Fahle, who had been born in Bradford, England. Although the nominal head of the AO was Ernst Wilhelm-Bohle, it was actually under the direct day-to-day control of Walter Schellenberg, head of the SD, the Gestapo’s counterintelligence service – who described Farben as a “state within a state” to his interrogators after the war. However, the overall boss of the AO was deputy fuehrer, Rudolf Hess.

The industrialists and bankers, who funded Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, had their contributions processed through Hjalmar Schacht’s account at the private Delbruck Schickler Bank in Berlin. The funds in this account were administered by Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess. Delbruck Schickler Bank was a subsidiary of Metallsgesellschaft A G (“Metall”), by far the largest non-ferrous metal company in Germany. Metallsgesellschaft was jointly owned by I G Farben and the British Metal Corporation. [13] One of the two British directors of “Metall” was Oliver Lyttelton who was appointed the Controller of Non-Ferrous Metals in 1939-40 and became the Minister of Production in 1942-5 and a member of Churchill’s War Cabinet. Lyttelton’s mother was by a merry coincidence, a member of the Rhodes-Milner Oxford “Group,” whereas the eldest son of the fifth Baron Lyttelton has been the private secretary to Lord Selborne during his years in South Africa. Selborne would take over leadership of the “Group” following Milner’s death in 1925. He was also, as I have remarked elsewhere, the wartime head of Britain's Special Operations Executive, which was the template for the American OSS. [14]

As stated earlier, the “Group” is the British arm of the American Order of the Skull and Bones – or is it the other way around? [15] Either way the Skull and Bones is a “chapter of a German secret society. The “originating” prong of the “Group” and the “Order” are, in the view of Prof. Antony Sutton, almost certainly the outlawed Bavarian Illuminati. [16]

THE “RED HOUSE” MEETING

It is self evident that the same behind-the-scenes banking and industrial forces who financed Hitler’s rise to power, as well as his subsequent military build-up, would also take all necessary steps to protect their hard investments once it became clear Hitler and Germany were doomed to defeat. Clarity arrived with the devastating defeat of Field Marshall von Paulus 6th Army Group at Stalingrad in January 1943. Any lingering doubts were erased with the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6th June 1944. Unable to repulse the Allied D-day invasion forces back into the sea, it was clear for all to see that Hitler’s days were numbered.

Two months after the D-day landings, a secret meeting was held in an elegant hotel in Strasbourg that was aimed at securing and protecting the wealth of nazi Germany and its loyal bankers and industrialists. On the morning of 10th August 1944, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Scheid, a lieutenant-general in the Waffen SS – as well as a director of the industrial company Hermansdorff & Schenburg - arrived at the Hotel Maison Rouge set in Strasbourg’s rue des France-Bourgeois. Dr. Scheid had been sent to host the meeting by none other than Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, by then the second most powerful man in nazi Germany, after Hitler.

Bormann’s rise to power followed on from the ill-fated flight of Rudolf Hess in 1941, when he parachuted to land in Scotland to secretly meet with the Duke of Hamilton. With the loss of his friend, and his plans for creating a secret alliance with Britain to fight Russia in tatters, Hitler had heaped all of Hess’ duties and responsibilities on to the broad bull-like shoulders of Bormann – with the exception of the office of deputy fuehrer, which Hitler abolished. This included Bormann taking over control of the AO.

In sending Dr. Scheid to Strasbourg, Bormann had confided in him that: “the steps to be taken as a result of this meeting will determine the post-war future of Germany,” adding that the plan was to insure an eventual “economic resurgence of Germany.” [17] Present at the meeting, in addition to Dr. Scheid, were representatives of Krupp, Messerschmitt, Rheinmetall, Bussing, Volkswagenwerk, engineers representing various factories in Posen, Poland – including Brown-Boveri – an important part of the German electrical industry that was part owned by two American companies – General Electric and International Telephone & Telegraph. Today, Brown Boveri has grown into a massive multinational corporation employing almost 200,000 staff worldwide and still maintains it close contacts with the US. Prior to his appointment as George W Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was on its board of directors. [18]

Bormann’s direction was that the industrialists should forge new contacts and alliances with foreign firms, as well as strengthening those already established. This should be done without attracting suspicion. Equally important was the capital flight programme of state and corporate assets to safe havens through the world, which Bormann ordered. Thus began Operation Eagle’s Flight. Critically, Bormann believed he needed nine months to fully complete the planned capital flight programme. [19] This meant that German forces must resist the Allies advance throughout the winter of 1944 and on until early mid May 1945. By a remarkable twist of fate, the war in Europe ended on 8th May 1945, two days short of Bormann’s estimate.

WHOOPSIDAISY

Less than a month later, however, English Field Marshall, Bernard Montgomery, laid out a daring plan that, were it to succeed, would have completely wrecked Bormann’s critical nine-month programme. When, on 23rd August 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, visited Montgomery’s HQ for lunch, followed by a private conference, Montgomery argued that German forces were in complete disarray and that a decisive thrust into the Ruhr would result in the end of the war before Christmas 1944. At Montgomery’s insistence, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith was excluded from the meeting, causing rancour. [20] Eisenhower left Montgomery’s HQ unconvinced and wavering.

With the closing of the Falaise gap, Montgomery was determined not to let Eisenhower waste a golden opportunity to bring the war to a close in 1944. On 4th September, Montgomery sent a coded signal “Personal for General Eisenhower Eyes Only,” laying out in detail an audacious plan to seize strategic bridges in the Netherlands followed by a full-blooded armoured thrust into Germany through the back door of the Ruhr – the very heartland of German industry and, coincidentally home to many of those industrialists Dr. Scheid’s capital flight conference had addressed less than a month earlier. The plan, which would become known as Operation Comet, was rejected by Eisenhower. Montgomery strenuously objected and a revised plan called Operation Market Garden, that would muster considerably more forces than the original Operation Comet, was eventually agreed on 10th September 1944 by Eisenhower. The final bridge to be captured by British airborne forces and held until the arrival of the armoured forces was located at Arnhem.

By coincidence too, it was the 4th of September, that Field Marshall Model directed Lt. General Bittrich’s badly mauled but veteran II SS Panzer corps to bivouac in the Arnhem area to refit and rest. Bittrich later stated that “there was no particular significance in Model choosing the Arnhem vicinity – except that it was a peaceful area where nothing was happening.” [21] Now in hindsight when armed with Bormann’s vital need for a full nine months for his capital flight programme to reach fulfilment, one wonders if other more subterranean factors influenced Model’s decision? Was treachery involved?

THE FRATERNITY

What is known for a fact is that Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands had been appointed Commander in Chief of Dutch forces by Queen Wilhelmina. During the weeks following the D-day landings, Prince Bernhard had remained in constant contact with his Ministers, the US Ambassador-at-Large, Anthony Biddle, and General Bedell Smith. [22] His close contact with these men was hardly the result of mere chance. As we shall see, nothing was to be left to chance by Bormann’s “Fraternity.” [23]

A member of the Biddle family, Thomas Bradish Biddle, had been amongst the very first members of the Order of the Skull and Bones, having been tapped in 1839, just six years after it founding in 1833. Anthony Biddle who’s full name was Anthony Joseph Drexel Biddle Jr., was not himself a member of the Order. Never the less, he was no innocent.

During the early months of WWII, Biddle was in Paris as the US Deputy Ambassador to France. It was here that he became close friends of the pro-nazi Duke and Duchess of Windsor, who spent a considerable period of time living in the home of Baron Eugene de Rothschild. However, Biddle’s greatest friend in Paris was Ambassador William Bullitt. Bullitt also held strong pro Hitler views and was responsible for introducing the American millionaire, Charles Bedaux, to the Windsor’s.

Bedaux was a good friend of I G Farben’s Hermann Schmitz, and had, in fact, been appointed as head of Farben’s commercial operations. His involvement with the Windsor’s wasn’t accidental, as he had been instructed by no less than SS Chief Heinrich Himmler to inveigle them to help in secret plans for a negotiated peace with England. A secret meeting held in the Hotel Meurice in Paris, between Bedaux, Rudolf Hess, Martin Bormann and Hollywood actor and nazi sympathiser Errol Flynn, the Duke of Windsor promised to help Hess contact the Duke of Hamilton, which “finally led to Hess’s dramatic landing on the Hamilton Estate in 1941.” [24]

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands also has a decidedly nazi past. German born as Prince Bernhard zur Lippe-Biesterfeld, he joined the nazi party in the early 1930’s, eventually donning the SS uniform. By 1935 he was gainfully employed in I G Farben’s intelligence department NW7. His match to Princess Juliana, the daughter of the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina, was reportedly arranged by Farben director, Gerhard Fritze, a relative of NW7’s chief, Max Ilgner. [25] At their marriage ceremony, the Prince’s closest friends struck up the old favourite, the Horst Wessel song, which was the anthem of the Nazis. Shortly after the marriage, the noble prince travelled to Berlin for a private meeting with Hitler, who had publicly intimated that the marriage represented an alliance between both nations - which was refuted by Queen Willhelmina. More telling was the fact that when he arrived in England, after the outbreak of war, and asked to work in British intelligence, his offer was declined by the Admiralty, because they didn’t trust him. Nor did the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower who refused him access to sensitive intelligence information. However, with the intervention of King George on Prince Bernhard’s behalf, he was eventually allowed to work in war planning councils. Whoops.

Moving on quickly; to understand the very special relationship between Prince Bernhard and General Walter Bedell Smith – who most certainly had complete access general Eisenhower’s intelligence - we need to advance several years. After the war, Prince Bernhard is believed to have been profitably employed dealing in art stolen during the war. Gerben Sonderman, who Prince Bernhard described as the “best friend I ever had” (presumably Adolf had by then been forgotten?), acted as the prince’s private pilot for transporting stolen art, according to Ton Biesemaat, who has written an expose of the art ring called “The Correggio Mystery. [26]

In 1941, Sonderman, a Dutch Fokker pilot, developed contacts with Germans involved in plundering Dutch art works. A close contact of his was Alois Miedl, a “banker, spy and art dealer” who occasionally dressed in SS uniform. [27] After the war, Miedl operated on behalf of the ODESSA, the SS escape network that transported nazi war criminals to safety in South America – particularly Argentina, where Bormann is believed to have escaped to. This also is a favourite destination for Prince Bernhard after the war, where he was usually accompanied by his best friend, Gerban Sonderman.

Another of those seemingly involved in this stolen art-trading ring was Hungarian nobleman, Prince Alfred zur Lippe-Weissenfeld, a relative of Prince Bernhard. By another of those remarkable coincidences, Prince Alfred’s daughter was the wife of Baron Hans Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza de Karzon, son of Fritz Thyssen’s brother and heir to the Thyssen family fortune.

Walter Bedell Smith, who as we have seen above, was in close contact with the prince during the period that Montgomery was drawing up his initial plan to capture the Dutch bridges and then dash to Berlin via the Ruhr. Just how close this friendship to Prince Bernhard was can be judged by the fact that after the war both he and Prince Bernhard went into business together. One might describe it as an “import-export company” because it involved an art trading company called “Bernard Ltd” that uses military aircraft to fly between Soesterberg – a short distance away from Prince Bernhard’s palace Soestdijk – and the USA.

In addition to his close personal friendship with Prince Bernhard, in August 1945, Bedell Smith donated his private plane to secretly fly nazi master spy Reinhard Gehlen, and five of his general staff, to Washington for secret talks. This move was in complete contravention of prevailing American policy and, according to author Charles Higham, could have resulted in court martial proceedings against Bedell Smith. [28]

Prince Bernhard’s family relationship with that of the Thyssen’s may go some way to explain why, in 1945, together with a unit of Dutch intelligence, Prince Bernhard travelled to the Russian zone in Berlin to recover a batch of buried “incriminating corporate papers” belonging to Fritz Thyssen, that evidenced “secret Thyssen ownership.” This small favour was carried out under the pretext that the daring Prince was recovering the Dutch crown jewels stolen by the Nazis. The papers were returned to Holland and deposited in the Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart, in Rotterdam, which was secretly owned by Thyssen. Known as “Operation Juliana” this cunning scheme was a body blow to Allied investigators who were anxiously seeking the “missing pieces of the Thyssen fortune.” [29] The US attorney to the Rotterdam bank was Allen Dulles, who had migrated from the OSS office in Bern, Switzerland, to become the US intelligence chief in post-war Germany.

FENCING THE ROSE

The Lippe family appears to have any number of connections to enterprises with intelligence connections. Take for example, the Order of the Rose of Lippe, a chivalric Order awarded to German House of Lippe. An offshoot of this order is the Noble Company of the Rose, founded by Ernst August Prinz zur Lippe – the first cousin of Prince Bernhard - and Sir Rodney Hartwell. Today, the Noble Order of the Rose is awarded exclusively and by invitation only to members of a curious research institute with a focus on genealogy, royalty, nobility, chivalry, heraldry, and related topics called The Augustan Society that is housed in a mansion located in the Mojave Desert near Dagget, USA, and which was founded in 1957.

The curiosity here is that many of the early, and some of the founding members, were formerly with wartime intelligence services, mostly the OSS. These included Crolian Edelen, Robert Formhals, Robert Gayre, John Driscoll, George Balling and Forest Barber – all of whom had also earlier been Shickshinny knights, a so called “fake” Order that claimed descent from the Russian Grand Priory of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The Shickshinny knights boasted some really heavy weight English and American pro nazi military and intelligence officers. [30]

It is alleged that the number one activity of the Augustan Society is intelligence gathering and that several members of the Society began working together three of four years before officially incorporating it as a legal entity (thus dating it back to circa 1954 – of which more later). It is also said that it is an intelligence front for SMOM, the official Vatican Order of the Knights of Malta.

The Augustan Society was originally located in Torrance, California, a location that gave rise to an insider adage “when you hear a sneeze in Torrance, you hear a ‘God Bless you’ on the Via Condotti.” The Via Condotti is the location of the Palazzo di Malta in Rome, the HQ of SMOM. The SMOM connection to this story is not without considerable interest. Members of this order have included such nazi notables as Dr. Herman Abs, a director of I G Farben and Deutsche Bank and who was known as “Hitler’s paymaster.” Robert Gayre, one of the founders of the Augustan Society was awarded the Grand Cross of Merit of SMOM. Another to be honoured by SMOM was nazi spymaster, Reinhard Gehlen – discussed above – who received the prestigious Grand Cross of Merito Melitense in 1948. Another honoured by SMOM was James Jesus Angleton, to whom we shall return shortly. Neither of the Dulles brothers were honoured by this August body simply because they were Protestants rather than Catholics.

Curiously however, Martin Bormann’s eldest son, Adolf Martin chose to take holy orders in 1946 following a preliminary course at Federaun Monastery, located close to Villach in Austria. This monastery was under the patronage of Bishop Hudal – one of the most senior Vatican insiders who was responsible for running the nazi underground escape railway known as the Ratlines. More alarming is the fact that Hudal was the “guardian” of Aldolf Martin Bormann, as he was also the guardian of another monk, Brother Avery Dulles, son of John Foster Dulles, elder brother of Allen Dulles. It’s a small world isn’t it.

The Knights of Malta were also responsible for helping thousands of the worst Nazis and members of the SS escape to freedom down these Ratlines, thus evading justice and avoiding the hangman’s noose at Nuremberg. Originally conceived as an underground railroad for wanted war criminals, it was quickly co-opted, I understand, to smuggle nazi gold, currency and other plunder to replenish the enormous sums lost by the Rockefeller family in pre-war German investments. Assisting Rockefeller in this sleazy endeavour were, Allen Dulles, Herbert Walker and James Jesus Angleton, the OSS Italian bureau chief and later CIA Rome Bureau chief. As such Angleton was in charge of the Vatican “account” and I understand that he learned about the homosexual proclivities of Pope Pius XII (formerly the Papal Nuncio in Bavaria) and was able to use this information for blackmail purposes. Meanwhile, Allen Dulles, Herbert Walker and James Jesus Angleton are said to have benefited most handsomely from “commissions” earned for their assistance in shifting plunder on behalf of the Rockefeller’s. Angleton benefited even more since he was able to co-opt SMOM, the intelligence arm of the Vatican, to work on behalf of US intelligence interests.

Patrons of the Augustan Society are listed as Ernst August Prinz zur Lippe, Dr. Otto von Habsburg – the old Austro-Hungarian Imperial House – and Prince Victor Emmanuel of Savoy – son of King Umberto II, the last Italian king who was forced to relinquish his throne after the war for being pro-Mussolini. [31] Prince Victor Emmanuel is the Grand Master of the authorised Vatican chivalric Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus.

Another of those beguiling coincidences is that Robert Gayre, who is mentioned above, was the head of the US branch of the racist organisation, the International Association for the Advancement of Eugenics and Ethnology, which is headquartered in Scotland. Eugenics formed a very powerful undercurrent in nazi ideology and thinking.

The IAAEE was founded by Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton who was a Wing Commander in the RAF during WWII. Lord Malcolm was, moreover, a member of the “Cliveden Set” - which is another name for the Rhodes-Milner Oxford “Group” – that was sympathetic to Hitler’s war aims. Not least, Lord Malcolm had the honour of being the brother of the Duke of Hamilton who, as we know, was the host of Rudolf Hess after his flight to Scotland in 1941.

Colonel Gayre also founded the Order of St. Lazarus of Jerusalem in Edinburgh, with the US branch of this Order being established by Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton. Lord Malcolm is a relative of the late Queen Mother via his mother, Pamela Bowes-Lyon. Robert Gayre was also the vice president of the International Commission for Orders of Chivalry (ICC). The VI International Congress of the ICC was held in Edinburgh in 1962, under the Honorary Presidency of the Duke of Edinburgh and was presided over by the Duke of Hamilton.

THE BRIDGE TOO FAR

With this diversion fairly comprehensively covered, let’s now briefly return to the actual events of Montgomery’s audacious Operation Market Garden – the approved plan to take and hold the five Dutch bridges that would open a way for a massive Allied thrust at the heart of Germany.

Those who have seen the excellent film, based on Cornelius Ryan’s book “A Bridge Too Far” will recall the sheer stubborn courage of those soldiers of the Third Battalion of the US 82nd Airborne, under the command of Major Julian Cook, who paddled across the Waal river in slow, cumbersome boats, under a blizzard of deadly German fire, to assault and hold the heavily defended but critical Nijmegen road Bridge, a few miles south of Arnhem.

This was a last ditch attempt to relive the sorely battered British paratroops at Arnhem led by Colonel John Frost. Eventually succeeding, at terrible cost, the Nijmegen Bridge was taken and held. But rather than rushing armour up the road to Arnhem to relieve Colonel Frost and ensure success of Montgomery’s daring plan, a British Guards Major arriving at Nijmegen Bridge told his American counterparts that “we do not move our tanks at night.” [33] A furious Colonel Tucker, the regimental commander of the 504th – that had secured the bridge, vehemently argued there was no time to waste before the Germans reinforced and that the British must grab the chance to reinforce Frost at Arnhem. Immune to these arguments, the English Major repeated “Well, we can’t move our tanks at night,” and then added “We will move them in the morning.” [34] The next morning, as expected, the whole area was heavy with German armoured reinforcements.

Cornelius Ryan does not name the Grenadier Guards Major in his book, which is unusual. There also appear to be some critical inaccuracies in the chain of events he sets forth in his book.

A recent BBC documentary series called “Battlefields” presented by historian Prof. Richard Holmes, focused one programme on “The Battle for Arnhem.” The programme makers interviewed on camera Captain Moffatt Burriss, commander of “I” company of the 504th, who was present when General Horrocks first asked to Colonel Tucker, commander of the American 504th, if he would take the heavily defended bridge by assaulting across the Waal. According to Burriss, General Horrocks said “This is an awesome task, can your lads do it?” Tucker replied, “Well general, if we take the bridge, will your tanks be lined-up ready to go?” Horrocks replied, “My tanks will be lined-up in full force, hell-bent for Arnhem and nothing will stop them.” [35]

Once the bridge had been taken, it was Captain Burriss who welcomed the first tanks across, and was astonished when they stopped. He asked the sergeant in the first tank why they had stopped. The sergeant who was commanding the first three tanks – soon to be joined by a fourth under the command a the Grenadier Guards major – said that there was a German anti tank gun up ahead and that “if I go up there that gun will knock out my tank.” Burriss said, “Well, we’ll go with you and get that gun.” But the offer wasn’t accepted because, the sergeant said “No, I can’t go, I’ve got no orders.” [36] A situation that is in marked contrast to General Horrocks intentions and his direct pledge to Colonel Tucker.

According to the Grenadier Guards war diary, they bridge at Nijmegen was merely “consolidated.” Also appearing on the interview was the Grenadier Guards major, who said, “it would have been quite difficult to go ahead.” Captain Burriss didn’t see it that way. He said during the programme that he “felt betrayed.” His men had taken the bridge at massive cost, facing machine guns, 20mm canons and numerous other weapons, but the British “were stopping because of one gun and they had a whole Corps of tanks” at their disposal.

There was virtually nothing between the Grenadiers and Arnhem 8 miles away. At the north end of Arnhem Bridge the British paratroopers still held out. With an injured Colonel Frost, his second-in-command Major, Tony Hibbert of the 1st Parachute Brigade, fought on. He could hear the tanks of the Grenadier Guards in the distance. But they didn’t arrive. Interviewed for the BBC programme he reflected wryly, perhaps even bitterly, that the Market Garden plan “Could and should have worked,” adding with a wry look that the tanks under the control of Lord carrington were “over the bridge before we were overrun.”

THE LOST BOYS

Royal patronage of the Grenadier Guards can be seen by virtue of the fact that reigning British monarch’s are usually appointed as “colonels-in-chief” of the Regiment. It is one of only five British regiments who have the honour of trooping the monarch’s “colour” the royal flag – in front of the Monarch on the occasion of their official birthday. The ceremony derives from mounting guard of the royal family and palaces and as “Household Troops” the Grenadiers are one of the regiments who have the honour of guarding the monarch. The rank and file of the Grenadiers swear an oath of allegiance to the monarch as head of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom. It is considerable significance that the oath is sworn to the reigning British monarch and not to Parliament. Interestingly, the first public engagement of the present monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, took place in 1942, when, as a young princess, she inspected the Grenadier Guards on her 16th birthday.

The Grenadier Guards officer he was referring to was Major Peter Alexander Rupert Smith, of the extremely powerful and influential Smith family - an almost publicly unknown dynasty of bankers that dates back 350 years. It was in the 1650’s when Thomas Smith founded Samuel Smith & Co, Bankers in Nottingham, which is believed to have been the first English bank headquartered outside of London. Successive generations of Smiths ensured that the family business flourished and by 1902 a total of ten branches were operating.

Not only did a leading member of the family befriended Lord Rothschild, but a family member later married a Rothschild. A further dynastic marriage was to the well-known Baring family of bankers. Their influence kept on expanding and expanding. Frances Dora Smith married Sir Claude Lyon-Bowes, who were the grandparents of Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon who married Prince Albert (Bertie) in 1923. Prince Albert became King George V1 in 1936 and Elizabeth become Queen Elizabeth 1 - later known as the Queen Mother. In recent years, newspaper article concerning the Queen Mothers favourable attitude to the “pro-peace movement” spoke of her “desire to avert war with Germany and for closer ties to be established between the two countries.” [37] One newspaper went so far as to state that the Queen would have willingly accepted a German occupation providing that the monarchy and her place in it remained intact. [38]

Her brother, David Bowes-Lyon, to whom she was exceptionally close was, before the war, a director of Lazard Brothers bankers and who also held an “important but vaguely defined role in SOE.” [39] The Lazard’s connection is significant inasmuch as this bank was a link to pro-nazi Sir Henri Deterding of Royal Dutch Shell and Viscount Bearsted of Hill Samuel, both of whom connect to Baron Kurt von Schroder – a hard core nazi, a financier of SS chief Heinrich Himmler and a leading member of the “circle of friends of the Reichsfuhrer.” Von Schroder coincidentally employed Allen Dulles as his American attorney [40] Royal Dutch Shell has long believed to be largely owned by the Dutch and British royal families.

Von Schroder was also a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship and a director of the bankers, Lazard Brothers. The Anglo-German fellowship was founded in 1935 by German banker Ernest Tennant - a close friend of Hitler’s Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop - and had numerous members who admired Hitler. Some, went even further.

For example, Sir Oswald Mosley founded the fascist British Black shirts, which was funded by Berlin. Another was nazi enthusiast, Admiral Sir Barry Domville, who would later become a Shickshinny Knight. [41] Charles Edward, Duke of Saxe Coburg & Gotha was sent by Hitler to England to be the President of the Fellowship with instructions to improve Anglo-German relations and to push for an alliance between both countries. Another member was the Duke of Hamilton, who as we have seen, was the British point of contact sought by Rudolf Hess in his flight to Scotland. Saxe Coburg Gotha is, of course, the real family name of the British royal family, who changed to Windsor during the First World War to dilute any expressions of animosity by the British public.

The connections of the British royal family to the Nazis continue. Prince Phillip Mountbatten’s (Duke of Edinburgh) closest sister in age, Princess Sophie, married Prince Christopher of Hesse, who was a member of Himmler’s staff, enlisting as an “agent.” [42] Prince Christopher would die in an aircraft accident in 1944, preceding by two years the extremely suspicious death of Prince George, the Duke of Kent and brother of the King, George VI – who also died in an aircraft “accident.”

The Duke of Kent died on 25th August 1942 aboard a Sunderland flying boat belonging to 228 Squadron of Coastal Command that crashed into a hill, called the Eagle’s Rock, near Berriedale, Caithness, Scotland. The authors of the book “Double Standards” make a strong case that the aircraft was sabotaged on the instructions of Churchill, in order to avert the conclusion of a secret alliance agreed in principle between Germany and England that was to be signed in Sweden by the Duke of Kent, presumably on behalf of his brother, the King. The authors believe that aboard the aircraft and travelling with the Duke was none other that deputy fuehrer, Rudolf Hess.

Staying at Balmoral the night before the crash, according to one biography of the Queen Mother, the Duke feasted on a last supper of sorts. His dinner companion was Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands. [43]

SNATCHING VICTORY FROM DEFEAT

It should come as no surprise to learn that the Grenadier Guards Major, Peter Smith, is the 6th Baron Carrington more commonly known as Lord Carrington, who in April 1985 was honoured by the Queen when he was made a knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, the oldest and most prestigious British Order of chivalry that dates back almost 700 years. As a member of the royal family bloodline, Lord Carrington’s illustrious career has included a stint as chairman of the secretive and elite Bildergers. Not least, he was a former President of the Pilgrim Society that was founded in London in 1902 (and in New York in 1903), as a dying wish of Cecil Rhodes. Another member of this ultra secret society was none other than the Duke of Kent, as was A J Drexel Biddle.

Founded in May 1954, the Bilderberg Conferences bring together the elite of the world to seek a consensus on how global matters are to be shaped. It is viewed with extreme suspicion by many who see it as working outside of democratic control to foist on them a dictatorial world order dedicated to the interests of the elite few.

Those instrumental in the founding of Bilderberg have included, General Walter Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles and Antoine Pinay, the ultra right French Prime Minister and Otto Wolff of the Cologne based firm Otto Wolff A. G., whose father was a substantial contributor to Hitler. Another was Sir Collin Gubbins, wartime head of the SOE who had established and trained Auxilary Units to resist underground in the event of a nazi invasion. These, in turn, were linked to the so-called Army “Oxen Units” that engaged in sabotage. One such Oxen Unit was in Berriedale at the time the Duke of Kent’s aircraft crashed. [44]

Attendees are numerous and very influential. These have included, for example, David Rockefeller, Walter Boveri Jr, son of the founder of Brown Boveri, Sir Eric Roll of Warburg’s London based merchant bank and Dr. Herman Abs of I G Farben – to name just a few who are relevant to this essay. The first Bilderberg chairman was Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, who remained chairing the meetings until 1976, when he stood down following his disgrace for accepting bribes in the Lockheed affair.

Of significance is the fact that the first Bilderberg meeting was held ten years after the failed Operation Market Garden, in a hotel (named the Bilderberg – hence the name of the group), that is located in Oosterbeek, Holland, just a few kilometres from both Arnhem and Nijmegen – and in the very middle of the fighting to take the Arnhem bridge.

Is it possible that Oosterbeck was chosen for the first meeting of Bilderberg in order to secretly celebrate the success in getting the wealth of nazi Germany to safety as planned by Bormann? Possibly. In the first two years of its existence, four meetings were held, on a semi-annual basis. [45] For 1954, meeting were held in May and again in September. In 1955, they were in March and September. Thereafter, meetings have been held just once annually in May. September 1954 was, of course, the month of the failed – or betrayed – Operation Market Garden.

1954 is of significance for other reasons, too, for it was in 1954 that the Allies finally agreed to return Western Germany to the status of a sovereign nation and German companies were, at last, freed from Allied control on 5th May 1955. The assets of Thyssen, Krupp and others that had been secreted abroad could now be untangled and returned to once again rebuild Germany – as foreseen by Bormann. [46] The treaty that ended the occupation of West Germany was signed in Paris in October 1954. [47]

The past is the future. Sadly.

ENDS

[1] By “revolving” I mean to suggest that whoever wins an American presidential election, US foreign policy remains fundamentally unchanged.

[2] It is here of considerable significance that it was following the Versailles Treaty that many German industrialists, including the Thyssen and Dornier family, first developed their financial techniques to cloak ownership of their assets.

[3] See Lynn Picknett and Clive Prince lecture “The Rise of the Rough Beast” at the Sauniere Society Symposium, 19th September 1999. Also see numerous articles on Synarchism and the Synarchist agenda published by EIR.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Antony Sutton, “The Secret Cult of The Order” – page 32.

[6] See article by John Loftus “How the Bush family made its fortune from the Nazis“

[7] See "Timeline of Treason: The Bush Family Connections to the Nazis" - from: http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/timeline.html

[8] See Anthony Sutton’s “Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution.

[9] See Sutton’s “Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler” – page 93

[10] See Charles Higham’s “Trading With The Enemy” – page 189.

[11] Ibid – page 211.

[12] Ibid – page 133.

[13] Ibid

[14] See my article “The Spoils of War” at www.deepblacklies.co.uk.

[15] See Carroll Quigley’s “The Anglo-American Establishment” – page 307 (published by GSG & Associates, California, 1981)

[16] See Sutton’s “The Secret Cult of the Order” – page 34/35.

[17] See Paul Manning’s “Martin Bormann – Nazi in Exile” – page 23.

[18] Two additional persons, both German government officials, were present at the Red House meeting.

[19] Manning's Martin Bormann - Nazi in Exile – page 32.

[20] See Cornelius Ryan’s “A Bridge Too Far” – page 48.

[21] Ibid – page70.

[22] Ibid – page 43.

[23] The Fraternity was the name chosen by author Charles Higham, in his book American Swastika, to describe the network of prominent people and large corporations in Allied and neutral nations that cooperated with the nazis.

[24] See Higham’s “Trading With The Enemy” – pages 179-181

[25] This account is contained in an unpublished manuscript on matters relating to the nazis and US business interests that was written by Prof. Peter Dale Scott, who kindly provided a copy to me.

[26] See: www.michelvanrijn.com/artnews/correggio.htm

[27] Ibid

[28] See Charles Higham “American Swastika” – page 260.

[29] See John Loftus article “The Dutch Connection” (available on the internet) for details of Operation Juliana. However, Dutch journalist, Ton Biesemaat disputes the accuracy of Loftus allegations, saying that the Prince was not directly involved but instead directed "influential friends and agents to do the job for him." Biesemaat also says that no crown jewels were recovered in Berlin but instead some "shares" of the royal family were recovered, although the main objective was to secure the fortune of the "Thyssen Bornemisza family" (private correspondence with this writer).

[30] For more on the Shickshinny Knights see my article “The Spoils of War”.

[31] Although I understand that King Umberto II in fact hated Mussolini, but consented to abdicate to avoid an outbreak of bloodshed.

[32]

[33] See Cornelius Ryan – who frustratingly neglects to name the British officer in question. Ryan is, however, by no means alone in this oversight. I could find no online source that did name the British officer, which may go some way to reveal the awesome actual power of a truly powerful family.

[34] Recorded by Thomas Pitt, a Sergeant in the 504th of the 82nd Airborne, who was present during these deliberations.

[35] Notes taken from the BBC TV documentary programme “Battlefields.”

[36] Ibid.

[37] See Lynn Picknett, Clive Prince and Stephen Prior’s “Double Standards – The Rudolf Hess Cover-Up” – page 265

[38] Ibid – The Independent on Sunday, 5 March 2000.

[39] Picknett, prince & Prior's "Double Standard's" – page 264.

[40] See Hugh Thomas SS-1 The Unlikely Death of Heinrich Himmler – page 92.

[41] On the Shickshinny’ s see my associated article The Spoils of War.”

[42] See Hugh Thomas SS-1 – as above – page 92.

[43] See “Double Standards” – above – page 433.

[44] Ibid – page 421

[45] See Holly Sklar’s “Trilaterialism” – page 171 which mentions this curious fact.

[46] See Paul manning’s “Martin Bormann” – above – page 281.

[47] Ibid – page 258.

[TonyGosling]

Lessons from the Battle of Nijmegen and Arnhem for the modern world
http://kreekoosterbeek.nl/event/seminar-the-traitors-of-arnhem/

Former BBC journalist Tony Gosling is in Gelderland, on the Island, to do a live radio broadcast to the UK and a talk at 4pm on Saturday afternoon in Oosterbeek about the battle of Arnhem, and implications today.

Most historians talk about the battle as an 'epic failure', celebrating the courage of the paratroopers 'against all odds'. But what few mention was that those odds were loaded less by the Nazis, than by elements within the Allied High command. The question is, why? A mystery which is one of the reasons thousands come to commemorate events year after year.

Operation Market Garden took place shortly after the notorious 'Red House Meeting, in Strasbourg' where Nazi industrialists finalised deals they were cutting with the Allied establishment for them and their industries to survive and benefit once war was over.

The Battles of Arnhem and Nijmegen are an historian's 'goldmine' because, even 74 years after the battle, evidence is still emerging about what went wrong and right back in September 1944.

Tony will present some of the latest evidence of the foreknowledge German Field Marshal Model had of the drops, which enabled him to place 'reserve' SS battle groups near Arnhem well beforehand.

He will look at the link between the battle and Prince Bernhard's historic 'Bilderberg meetings' which began ten years after the end of the war in Oosterbeek, the same pocket where the British paratroopers were isolated.

Also evidence which emerged last year of Nazi nuclear tests which prove Germans had enriched uranium, an important bargaining chip as the war drew to a close. Some in the Allied high command were clearly paying more attention to feathering their own nests after the war than any kind of 'race to Berlin'.

Tony will look at evidence of 'secret deals' between Hitler's treasurer Martin Bormann, who some say died outside the Führerbunker at the end of the war, and Churchill's private secretary and 'man of mystery' Major Desmond Morton, for around a billion dollars of Nazi loot.

Tony will also air recordings of exclusive interviews with some of the soldiers who were in Nijmegen and Arnhem, which point not to flaws in Montgomery's plan, but incompetence at the top of the British Army verging on treachery.

The result has been a modern world where the far right is again on the rise in Europe, in Ukraine too, where Cold War hatred of Moscow is being rekindled, and where Hitler's Swiss banking financiers are again working against the interests of ordinary Europeans.


Tony Gosling worked as a BBC radio journalist in London, and Salisbury, Wiltshire.
For the last ten years he has presented a weekly Politics Show in Bristol, UK, with Oxford Economist Martin Summers.

[Whitehall_Bin_Men]

found these excerpts of the signals in my old files - can't remember the exact source now, either Bennett's book "Ultra in the West" or the British Offical History about intelligence:

2 September 1944 , XL 8994

A decrypt signalled on 2 September covered orders by C-in-C West for 9th Panzer, 21st Panzer, Panzer Lehr, 3rd Panzergrenadier and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions to refit in the area ST.AVOLD-SAARBRUCKEN, 2nd Panzer and 116th Panzer Divisions to refit south of LIEGE and 1st, 2nd, 9th, 10th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions to refit north of NAMUR-ST.TROND.

5 September 1944

A decrypt signalled on 5 September reported that those elements of 2nd and 116th Panzer and 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions that were not still operating were to rest and refit in the area VENLO-ARNHEM-S’HERTOGENBOSCH.
(DEFE 3/221, XL 9188 of 5 September). German Army Group B order sent pm, 4 September, Xl 9188 sent 1152, 5 September.

6 September 1944

(DEFE 3/221, XL 9245 of 6 September)
“Army Group B Order quoted by FLIVO 1730 hrs 5th. [1] Stab Panzer Army Five with subordinated headquarters 58th panzer Corps to transfer beginning 6th to area Koblenz for rest and refit by C-in-C West. [2] Headquarters 2nd SS Panzer Corps subordinated Army Group B, to transfer to Eindhoven to rest and refit in co-operation with General of Panzer Troops West and direct rest and refit of 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions, 9th SS Panzer Division and 217th Heavy Assault Abteilung. [Comment: Elements these divisions and 10th SS Panzer Division ordered 4th to area Venlo-Arnhem-Hertogenbosch for refit in XL9188].”


HP220 150752Z/9/44 DEFE 3/225
New location FLIVO ARMY GROUP B 0700 Fourteenth OOSTERBEEK: 4 km WEST of ARNHEM.

15 September 1944
HP242
“Allies in German reports: [A] addressed to unspecified on evening 9th. 30th British Corps (2nd Br Army) between Antwerp and Hasselt. Bringing up further Corps possible. Eleven to fourteen divisions with eight to nine hundred tanks. Photo recce tasks [COMMENT: presumably known from intercepts] indicate probable intention is thrust mainly from Wilhelmina Canal on both sides of Eindhoven into Arnhem [COMMENT: further specification of area incomplete but includes “west of Nijmegen” and “Wesel”] to cut off and surround German forces western Netherlands.

HP499 DEFE 3/226
Gruppe West Reports: Since 1230 hrs, 17th Allied Airborne landing area Arnhem, Nijmegen, Emmerich

HP706 DEFE 3/227
According C-in-West on 17th. Assault Gun Brigade 280 to be brought up on 16th to Aachen from Denmark, to be subordinated to Army Group B.

HP691 DEFE 3/227
C-in-West ordered 18th that Wehrkreis 6 alert at once 4000 men of 2 Parachute Corps as well as elements of 6 Para Div at troop training area Wahn and send them to Para Army.


https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=139717&start=195

[Whitehall_Bin_Men]

33. Intelligence
http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html

The plan must be based, and orders given, upon the latest possible information. Intelligence personnel must build the information up in advance and keep it up to date. A balance must be struck between the amount of information needed and the time available for getting it. The intelligence branch must be given detailed instructions as to what information is needed and the dates by which the various items are required. Information will be required about the following:-

(a) Dispositions, strength, armament and morale of the enemy's air and land forces. (Examination of top secret ULTRA code intercepts from 1 to 17 September gave detailed information regarding the disposition of German troop elements in the Eindhoven and Arnhem area, specifically including the ordered movement of the II SS Panzer Corps, on 4 September, to an area notheast of Arnhem. When Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, MajGen Walter Bedell Smith conveyed this information to Field Marshal Montgomery, he belittled the information and dismissed any possible modification to his plan. This fact is further exacerbated by the visit to Montgomery on 6 September by His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands with extensive details of German troop deployments around Arnhem and elsewhere in Holland. Field Marshal Montgomery was again dismissive of this intelligence, even though it was corroborated by the ULTRA data. In addition, and to reiterate, Maj B. Urquhart had imagery from a photo-reconnaissance mission he had ordered showing significant elements of the II SS Panzer Corps in the immediate area, right where Ultra had said they were. LtGen Browning rejected these photographs virtually out of hand.)

In all truth and objectivity the 9th Waffen-SS Hohenstaufen and 10th Waffen-SS Frundsberg Panzer Divisions, comprising the II SS Panzer Corps, were a mere shadow of their former selves, both in equipment and effective troop strength. Both divisions had been badly ravaged by the Allies from the initial D-Day landings in June to the time of the commencement of Operation Market Garden, on 17 September 1944. However, even at reduced strength (approximately 6,000 to 7,000 personnel per division), elements of both divisions, as well as other Waffen-SS units in the immediate and proximate areas of both Oosterbeek and Arnhem, responded to the massive British parachute and glider-borne attack with alacrity, efficiency and resolve. Specifically the immediate and tactically effective “Sperrlinie” (Blocking line) established by SS Oberstrumbannführer (Lieut Colonel) Ludwig Spindler (Kampfgruppe Spindler) and SS Hauptstrumführer (Captain) Sepp Kraftt actions, proved decisive.

(b) Location of his mobile reserves, especially tanks. (See previous comments)


A particular nemesis to the airborne forces was the Strumgeschutz III,
an assault gun very effectively employed by the German forces as an
infantry support weapon in the urban environment of both Arnhem
and Oosterbeek (click on photo to enlarge)
(c) Appreciation of the times when intervention by the enemy reserves can be expected if their moves are unhindered.

(d) Details of possible objectives

(e) Dispositions of enemy anti-aircraft defences (RAF planners at 38 Group (Transport Command), commanded by Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollingshurst had failed to obtain current available intelligence on the flak defenses at Deelen airfield, seven miles north of Arnhem. Anti-aircraft batteries as well as all aircraft had been removed after a RAF bomber attack on the airfield on 3 September had rendered it inoperative. These facts were confirmed by a photographic reconnaissance mission flow by No. 541 Squadron RAF on 6 September. Because of this critical lapse Hollingshurst adamantly refused to consider any airborne drops in the immediate area of the Arnhem main road bridge. His argument being that troop carrying or glider tug aircraft after making their run-in would have to turn north directly over heavy flak, and if they turned south there was the danger of collision with aircraft dropping the US 82nd Airborne Division over Nijmegen.)

(f) Any weaknesses in enemy's defensive system.
(g) Location and description of possible dropping and landing zones.
(h) Possibility of capturing transport intact.
(j) Possible use of enemy cable or wireless communications.
(k) Attitude of local inhabitants.
(l) Local supplies available, including water.
(m) Meteorological forecast.

Much of the above information is of the greatest interest to the RAF and both the Army and RAF intelligence personnel must work in close co-operation. (As can be seen from the above discussions there was an abject failure of co-operation between 1st Allied Airborne Army (LtGen Browning), 1st Airborne Division, and the RAF.)

An Expanded Discussion of Intelligence Lapses before Operation Market-Garden

Even using a rudimentary manual pattern recognition analysis, sorting on the single word 'Arnhem' within the massive volume of intercepted and/or decrypted message traffic, an intelligence analyst could gain a fair insight as to the threat in the immediate objective area (underlining added). The following are two examples:

6 September - ULTRA Intercept No. XL9245:…'(2) Headquarters 2nd SS Panzer Corps subordinated Army Group B, to transfer to Eindhoven to rest and refit in co-operation with General of Panzer Troops West and direct rest and refit of 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions, 9th SS Panzer Division and 217th Heavy Assault Gun Abteilung. (COMMENT: Elements these divisions and 10th SS Panzer Division ordered 4th to area Venlo-Arnhem-Hertogenbosch for refit in XL9188.'

15 September - ULTRA Intercept No. HP242: 'Allies in German reports: (A) addressed to unspecified on evening 9th. 30 British Corps (2nd Br Army) between Antwerp and Hasselt. Bringing up further corps possible. Eleven to fourteen divisions with eight to nine hundred tanks. Photo recce tasks (COMMENT: presumably known from intercepts) indicate probable intention is thrust mainly from Wilhelmina Canal on both sides Eindhoven into Arnhem (COMMENT: further specification of area incomplete but includes "west of Nijmegen and "Wesel") to cut off and surround German forces western Netherlands.'

Quoting Harclerode, '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears.

Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armour in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.'


One of a series of RAF reconnaissance photos taken 6 September 1944
(The shadow of the tresses of the Main Arnhem Road Bridge, top center,
can be discerned when this image is enlarged) (click on photo to enlarge)

In addition to Major Brian Urquhart's aerial photo-reconnaissance evidence, which was summarily dismissed by 'Boy' Browning on 15 September, Harclerode cites another individual at HQ First Allied Airborne Army. 'While Browning's staff received only a limited amount of ULTRA intelligence, an RAF air intelligence officer, Wing Commander Asher Lee was alarmed at what he discovered when studying evidence of enemy activity in the area of Arnhem. Lee had previously worked in Section AI3b of the Air Staff, a department which received a large volume of ULTRA material as part of its work in assembling and updating the Luftwaffe's order of battle. Subsequently posted to First Allied Airborne Army, Lee nevertheless had managed to retain access to another ULTRA source and a visit to it produced material which confirmed the presence of enemy armour in the vicinity of Arnhem. On informing Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton, the American commander of First Allied Airborne Amy (Browning's immediate superior), Lee was ordered to raise the matter with 21st Army Group. He visited Montgomery's headquarters but could find no one who would listen to him.'

Again from Harclerode, 'It was not until 16 September that SHAEF reported the presence in the Arnhem area of elements of 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Intelligence Summary No. 26, published on that date, states: '9th SS Panzer Division, and presumably the 10th, have been reported withdrawing to the Arnhem area in Holland; there they will probably collect new tanks from a depot reported in the area of Cleves'.

In summary, even setting aside the intelligence data developed by the Dutch Resistance (possibly still partially tainted by Abwehr penetration, but corroborated by ULTRA) and presented personally by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands on 6 September, Field Marshal Montgomery personally received, and more importantly summarily dismissed, the following inputs between 10 to 16 September:
• Two face to face direct warnings by his own 21st Army Group Chief of Intelligence, one combined with his own Brigadier General Staff (Operations) acting Chief of Staff.
• A face to face direct warning by SHAEF's Chief of Staff and Chief of Intelligence.
• A further attempted warning by an RAF air intelligence officer from HQ, First Allied Airborne Army (In fairness never delivered, probably because he was of the lowly rank of mere Wing Commander seeking an 'audience' with Montgomery, or for that matter any member of his staff.)

The immediate and repeated dismissal of this intelligence data, is only exceeded by the arrogant and derisive manner in which it was conducted. Further exacerbating the situation is the fact that this attitude precluded any flow-down of available information to field commanders at the division and brigade level. This assessment applies equally to Lieut-General Browning's rejection of a parallel set of information. It is curious that to the best of author's knowledge Browning chose not to document his recollections in a book.

An interesting recent reiteration and reinforcement of this appraisal comes from a rather unique perspective. Writing in his newly published book, A TALE OF TWO NAVIES, Geopolitical, Technology and Strategy in the United States Navy and the Royal Navy 1960-2015, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2017 (ISBN-13: 978-1-68247-120-1), Dr. Anthony R. Wells (CDR, RN, Rtd., spent over 40 years in a career of naval intelligence with both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy) relates a conversation he had with then MajGen John Frost in 1978, regarding Operation Market-Garden. MajGen Frost contrasted the relative completeness of the intelligence package (including early Enigma decryptions) available to him as a young Parachute Regiment officer, in executing the highly successful Bruneval Raid (Operation Biting - February 1942), and the deplorable circumstances regarding intelligence in the preparations for the Battle of Arnhem (September 1944).

The following are excerpts from Dr. Well’s book;
“General Frost expounded. All-source-intelligence had gone into the planning of the Bruneval raid – from SIGINT collection, Enigma data, and aerial photography to work by MI6’s agents in France and reports from the French Resistance.”

As a momentary aside; “The general stressed one other equally important factor, the need for reliable, secure, and redundant communications that would hold up in any weather condition and location. The number of radios counted, in case one radio failed or was or was damaged or the operator became a casualty or was captured. Multiple systems were required tu ensure survivable communications.”

But to the point at hand; “By contrast, Operation Market Garden was to quote General Frost, an unmitigated disaster caused largely, but not wholly, by extremely poor intelligence planning and execution and the failure of the high command to accept the intelligence provided as ground truth. He said that underscoring this failure to appreciate the intelligence provided was a mind-set so fixated on the strategic plan that the tactical detail and execution was assumed to follow automatically.”

Rhetorical question, who possibly could Gen Frost be referring to?

36. Choice of Dropping Zones and Landing Zones
There are three aspects to be considered in the selection of dropping and landing zones: tactical, technical and RAF.
(a) Tactical aspects

(i) The troops, whether parachutists or air landing, must have a reasonable chance of arriving and forming up before having to fight. (The second lift jumped and landed right in the middle of an ongoing battle.)

(ii) Dropping or landing zones must not be so far from the objective that all surprise is lost before the troops reach them. (Dropping and landing zones ranged from five to eight miles from the primary objective, the main road bridge in Arnhem. In an attempt to land closer MajGen Roy Urquhart and Col George Chatterton, OC, The Glider Pilot Wings recommended that a glider element be used in a coup-de-main attack on both the north and south bridge approaches. The 6th Airborne Division had successfully carried out the exact type of attack on the Orne River Bridge (Pegasus Bridge) at Normandy, a few months before. The following is the ensuing conversation with LGen Browning as related forty years later by Col Chatterton, and contained in Peter Harclerode's excellent book, ARNHEM, A Tragedy of Errors:
'I went to see General Browning and suggested to him that we were landing too far away but he said that it was out of our hands. It was an RAF decision because they said that the bridge was so well defended by anti-aircraft guns that they wished to keep their tugs away from it. I nevertheless suggested that my pilots could land their gliders near the bridge and although there would be more casualties on landing due to the size and unevenness of the enclosures, it would surely be preferable to landing miles away. When Gen Browning said that no doubt there would be more tugs shot down this way, I suggested that this could be avoided by a remote release, so allowing the tugs to turn back for home well before the bridge. He replied, "George, it's too late. It has all been decided"')

(iii) Care must be taken that the troops are not diverted from their object by having to overcome enemy posts between the dropping or landing zone and their objective. (MajGen Richard "Windy" Gale, OC, 6th Airborne Division, in his meeting with LtGen Browning, strongly advised that at least one parachute brigade should be dropped as a coup-de-main force immediately adjacent to the main road bridge, securing the primary objective until the balance of the division arrived. MajGen Gale was adamant, stipulating that he would have pressed for that condition 'to the point of resignation'. LtGen Browning would not budge, and asked MajGen Gale not to report the conversation to MajGen Urquhart. MajGen Gale verbally conveyed this meeting to Maj Geoffrey Norton, Curator of the Airborne Forces Museum at Aldershot, in the early 1970's; with the stipulation that the information not be made known during the lifetime of any of the personalities involved.)

(iv) In landings by day there should be cover close at hand for the assembly of forces. Covered approaches to the objective are also desirable.

(v) Owing to vulnerability of the troops to tank attack they should be landed in country free from an immediate threat of one. (Again, photo-reconnaissance showing major elements of the II SS Panzer Corps in the immediate area was discounted, and virtually rejected out of hand.)

(vi) Whenever possible alternative dropping and landing zones must be selected beforehand. Arrangements must be made to divert subsequent waves to them if necessary. This is a safeguard in case the initial zone is found to be heavily defended or is otherwise unsatisfactory. (To the best of the author’s knowledge this factor was not taken under consideration during the planning.)

(b)Technical aspects

(c)RAF aspects

38. Operation orders. Experience has shown that plans hastily prepared during the course of operations lead to a serious loss of effort. Therefore detailed orders or instructions will be prepared for all operations planned a considerable time ahead. These will cater for the original landings, the alternative plan, and for all tasks in which airborne troops are likely to be used in subsequent operations. Nevertheless, airborne troops must be trained to produce the orders and instructions needed for a plan prepared at short notice.
The details of the plan are usually settled at a series of conferences between commanders and the various staffs. A written record of decisions will be kept. This may take the form either of orders issued from time to time or of minutes of the meetings. These written decisions will prevent confusion in a necessarily complex plan. (The planning for Operation Market-Garden, the largest airborne assault in history, including three Allied airborne divisions, the Polish 1st Independent Airborne Brigade Group, two wings of The Glider Pilot Regiment, British Army 30 Corps, two major RAF Transport Groups, the US 9th Troop Carrier Command and substantial additional supporting elements, was limited to only seven days. Unfortunately the fluidity of the entire tactical situation in the Netherlands, and rapidly solidifying German defenses, demanded rapid action in any event.)

41. Liaison with the main forces.
When airborne troops are co-operating with major military forces, close touch must be maintained between them. Liaison officers, provided with adequate means of communications, should be exchanged. It will sometimes be desirable for airborne officers to be detailed to accompany the leading armoured or other formations. Patrols must be sent out, both by the airborne forces and the main forces, to make contact at the earliest opportunity along previously agreed routes. In some circumstances it may be possible for inter-communication aircraft to be used between the airborne and the main forces. Nothing which would add to the liaison between the forces must be neglected. (The Wireless Sets No. 19HP, (limited to two because of weight and dimensions) included in 1st Airborne Division’s communications plan were intended to provide linkage to 30 Corps artillery units. These sets were jeep mounted and provided voice communications over a nominal 25 mile range with a power output of 30 watts. By about 1000 hours on 19 September one of the division’s No. 22 sets (also jeep mounted), after previous intermittent receive-only traffic, was able to pass to 30 Corps via a forward Canadian unit that the main Arnhem bridge was intact and held at the north end. Given the range of the No.22 set this transmission had to be not more than 20 miles.
In his excellent book, Echoes From Arnhem, William Kimber and Co. Ltd., London, 1984, then Capt Lewis L. Golden, OBE (Adjutant, 1st Airborne Divisional Signals) states, ‘Market showed that all the signals’ fears over the inadequacy of their radios in the special conditions were justified. The extended dispositions of 1st Airborne Division, its distance from 1 Airborne Corps Main at Nijmegen, the difficult communication characteristics of the area in which the fighting was taking place, and heavy radio interference had often resulted in sporadic contact at best, and sometimes even no communication at all, on particular links. What was suffered through insufficient power was made worse by fierce enemy action. Ad hoc arrangements, both for air support and in the formation of 1 Airborne Corps Signals, had contributed to the failures.’

Although it had no apparent impact on communications, and it is not even mentioned in Captain Golden’s book, it is of passing interest that the No. 38 sets of the XXI Independent Company (Pathfinders), were withdrawn just two weeks before the operation, and replaced with early production models of the vastly superior Wireless Set No. 42. Some experts contend that this radio was the finest wireless set to come out of WWII. Configured as either a manpack or vehicle mounted unit, the set had a 10 watt output and was operable on the march, with a nominal range of 25 miles (It is interesting that the set never entered full production).



Wireless Set No. 42

To the best of the author’s knowledge no alternative/redundant provisions for communications via aircraft-borne communications links were provided, or even considered during the planning. In addition please see the discussion under PART IX – Intercommunication.

42. Preliminary training and rehearsals
Before an operation of any magnitude can be undertaken, a period for preparations and rehearsals is necessary. Each service will first require a short time in which to settle domestic details. Special training will be required for pilots in dropping parachutists and for towing gliders. Training with the RAF will then be carried out. (There were no rehearsals of consequence.)

43. The importance of simplicity.
The plan must be as simple and flexible as possible. The following pitfalls and complications should be avoided:-

(g) A plan completely dependent on the arrival of any one sub-unit. (In order to compensate for the distances from the dropping and landing zones to the Arnhem main road bridge, a critical element of the planning was to deliver the armed jeeps of the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, commanded by Maj Freddie Gough, in the first lift. The entire squadron in a coup-de-main would then make a dash to the bridge, seize and hold it, pending the arrival of the 1st Parachute Brigade. While relatively well armed with rapid fire Vickers K-guns the jeeps were not armored, thus extremely vulnerable to ambush, which is exactly what occurred approaching the Wolfheze railway station.)

PART III - ASSEMBLY OF FORCE AT TAKE-OFF AIRFIELDS

PART IV - THE APPROACH

PART V - THE LANDING
61. Choice of landing and dropping zones
See Part II, Para 36.
PART VI - ACTION AFTER THE LANDING
66. Defence of dropping zones and landing zones
The methods of defending the dropping and landing zones depend upon the comparative importance of taking an immediate advantage of the surprise obtained by the landing and that of conducting more deliberate operations.
If the landings are made near to the enemy, it will be essential to attack and surprise the enemy in the vicinity before he has time to discover the presence of airborne troops and launch a counter-attack. To succeed in this, companies must be landed in separate areas around their objective.
If landings are made in areas remote from the enemy positions, it may be necessary to concentrate the unit before beginning the approach to the objective. The concentration will be protected both by troops allotted by division or brigade and by each unit providing for its local defence.
Areas used for landing reserves and supplies will be protected under divisional arrangements. An assaulting parachute battalion will be severely handicapped if ordered, in addition to its main task, to defend a dropping zone. (The entire 4th Airlanding Brigade, delivered in the first lift, was relegated to this task, with the consequence being a significant splitting of the attacking force at a critical initial point of the battle. This specific critical factor was reiterated by Lieutenant-Colonel T.B.H. Otway, in his official history entitled, AIRBORNE FORCES, Imperial War Museum, London, 1990, p.292; 'Lessons…88. An airborne division is designed to fight as a whole, but if, as at Arnhem, it is split and part carried in a second lift some 24 hours later, the effective strength for immediate offensive action will be reduced to that of a brigade, which is what happened.' This statement is taken virtually verbatim from Major-General R.E. Urquhart's Report on Operation "MARKET', LESSONS, PLANNING; 223.)

68. General
Differences between the tactics of airborne and other troops are due to the relatively weak strength of airborne forces, their lack of heavy supporting weapons, shortage of mechanical vehicles and to the fact that airborne troops have to fight the entire battle exposed to enemy attacks from every direction. (This consideration was further exacerbated by the requirement for the bulk of the 4th Airlanding Brigade to maintain a defensive perimeter around the initial dropping and landing zones awaiting the second lift. This division of forces substantially diminished the weight of the initial attack eastward from the landings at Ginkels and Renkum Heaths, through Oosterbeek, and on into Arnhem. This ended in the resultant defense of two perimeters, one at the main road bridge, the other at the Hartenstein Hotel in Oosterbeek.)
It is important that they should be used for tasks where:-

(a)The enemy defences are weak. (Had the available critical intelligence data on German forces, specifically in regard to the II SS Panzer Corps, been appreciated and utilized, the decisions regarding selection of the dropping and landing zones, as well as the number of lifts, might well have been different.)

(b)Heavy air support can be given. (See discussion in 8 above and 77 below.)

(c)Motorized mobility is not needed. (See 43 (g) above regarding the planned use of the armed jeeps of the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron in a coup-de-main dash to the main road bridge.)

69. Movement between the dropping or landing zones and the objective
To avoid the loss of time between the dropping or landing zones and the objective, enemy defences between them will be avoided where possible. (Given the distances which had to be covered, primarily on foot, rendered this virtually impossible.)

PART VII - AIR SUPPORT OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
75. Advance on Objective
During the advance, in addition to bombardment of the objective, enemy mobile reserves must be pinned to the ground.

77. Impromptu targets for air attack will be engaged through the normal army air support control methods. The control will be with the RAF commander in the base area. Demands for support will be made through the tentacles with airborne headquarters. Direct communication between the troops on the ground and aircraft in the air is required. (Effective close tactical air support ranged from at best sparse to virtually non-existent. See the Discussion in 8 above. However, recent discovery of the albeit unsuccessful attempt to deploy RAF No. 6080 LWU and No. 6341 LWU, as previously discussed, would mitigate this assessment.)

Full use will be made of ground/air recognition.

PART VIII - ADMINISTRATION
(There does not appear to be any obvious command disregard for the directives contained in this part of the pamphlet.)

PART IX - INTERCOMMUNICATION
(Although communications throughout Operation Market-Garden were, and remain historically, a highly contentious issue, there does not appear to be any obvious command disregard for the directives contained in this part of the pamphlet. It is instructive to note that the lack of continuous effective communications in the operational environment (distances, built-up urban areas, polder and copses) of Holland has been cited by many of the commanders as a major problem. This specifically includes MajGen R.E. Urquhart, as well as LtGen F.A.M."Boy" Browning. Capt Lewis Golden, OBE, again in his book, addresses communications during the entire operation in extremely well researched detail. It suffices that LtGen Browning's contention as late as Friday, 22nd September that "the picture of Urquhart's situation was apparently very vague", cannot be supported by signals' records or the full context of message traffic originated by his headquarters or received from 1st Airborne Division. This purported "ambiguity" resulted in LtGen Browning's declining the offer on the 22nd by MajGen Edmund Hakewill Smith, OC, 52nd Lowland Division (Airlanding) to fly glider-borne elements of his command into the immediate battle area in an attempt to relieve the beleaguered troops.

A Retrospective on Intercommunications during Operation Market-Garden from the Perspective of Modern Telecommunications Technology and British Army Communications Procedures

In February 2004, on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Battle of Arnhem, John Berry, a radio communications specialist and the Managing Director of ADTI, Ltd., conducted an in-depth technical analysis and published a White Paper entitled, ‘Communications at the battle of Arnhem: A modern day technical analysis’ which can be found at: http://www.atdi.co.uk/download/white-papers/Communications%20at%20the% 20Battle%20of%20Arnhem%20-%20technical%20analysis%20%28White%20Paper%2 9.pdf.Subsequent to the publication of that analysis, and drawing upon its findings, Maj John W. Greenacre of the British Army, while in attendance at the Advanced Command and Staff Course, published a paper entitled, "Assessing Reasons for Failure: 1st Airborne Division Signal Communications during ‘Operation Market Garden"(use this entire title as a search term when you get to cited URL) in the journal, Defence Studies of Autumn 2004 which can be found at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a714000101&db=all.

It is hoped that most readers will acknowledge that ranked even higher than logistics and intelligence, effective communications has been and remains, the most important element of warfare.

Without going into the in-depth details of each author’s excellent analysis (which those interested certainly can do using the cited URLs), two fundamental concluding points are made.
The first, by Perry, being that the technical performance capabilities of the two major wireless sets employed, the Wireless Sets No.22 and No.68 were capable of achieving a range of > 6 to 10db signal to noise ratio (modern military communications planning uses a 13db ratio as excellent) sufficiently adequate for reliable voice communications from the on-set of operations on September 17, 1944.

Maj Greenacre’s analysis concurs with this assessment, He attributes the failure to lack of implementation/maintenance of correct communications procedures by commanders and signals staff of the 1st Airborne Division. He further states, ‘Many risks were accepted during the planning of Operation ‘Market Garden’. One of those risks was that communications for 1st British Airborne Division would be stretched. Deane-Drummond advised Divisional HQ of the difficulties that were likely to be encountered and the risk that this represented. ‘It was known, it was explained, it was recognised, it was accepted.’ The signals plan therefore had to be formed in the knowledge that they would be operating at the very limit of their resources. There was little flexibility available in the signals plan and adequate safeguards against breakdown either were not available or possible or were negated by the situation during the battle. Consequently when procedural mistakes were made the plan did not stand up to the situation.’ In conclusion he cites a prophetic quotation, ‘No signal plan [is] an isolated affair’.

In a addition to a background in intelligence, which initiated my original interest in the Battle of Arnhem, I have a reasonably extensive background in systems engineering. Essentially systems engineering is the discipline used to integrate total systems in order to achieve a given quantifiable level of performance, as well as maintaining, reliability (redundancy), maintainability (ease/speed of repair), availability(operability) and survivability also at given measured levels, all achieved within what is called a life cycle cost. It incorporates, the total operational environment, human operator(s), hardware subsystems, software subsystems, data transfer, normal operational, as well as alternative (casualty), modes of operation/ procedures, and most importantly the specific detailed interfaces between each of these elements. It includes the use of operational research, computer modeling/simulation, systems analysis, and various other engineering knowledge. In most final system design configurations a carefully balanced compromise of all these factors must be struck. With that as a background I would like to draw an analogy to the delicate and demanding task of airborne operational planning as it evolved in World War II, and more specifically in the case of Operation Market-Garden.

With that perspective I would like to discuss what can be termed comprehensive negative synergy or ‘the perfect storm’. It is my personal opinion that this is precisely what resulted from the planning leading up to Operation Market Garden. Any one erroneous planning factor can impose a risk factor. However, when almost a comprehensive set of planning factors are in error, this does not constitute a balanced compromise. It is a preordained recipe for failure. My contention is that planning decisions that were made resulted in the following:

Loss of the element of surprise
Loss of mass (Effectively down to brigade strength for 2 days, due to having to hold the DZ/LZs)
Degradation in communications (Impact of DZ/LZ distances to objective on range of available communications equipment)
Loss of command and control at all levels (Due to lack of communications)
Severe degradation in logistics, loss of re-supply including spare wireless sets and batteries(Due to lack of communications)
Degradation in concentration of available firepower (Due to lack of communications) However the superior level of training and implementation of communications procedures within the Light Regiment, Royal Artillery overcame any technical difficulties, and consistently provided exemplary fire support during the entire course of the operation.
Loss of available limited maneuver element (Due to lack of communications)

Conclusion
In all fairness to Field Marshal Montgomery, in his autobiography, he attributes the failure of Operation Market-Garden to four factors. First that the operation was not regarded at Supreme Headquarters, i.e. by General Eisenhower, “as the spearhead of a major Allied movement on the northern flank designed to isolate, and finally to occupy, the Ruhr – the one objective in the West which they the Germans could not afford to lose”. Second that the airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective – the bridge (he takes full blame for this mistake). Third was the weather. Fourth was the fact that “the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation.”

Given the fluidity of the European Theatre of Operations extant in late August of 1944, compounded by the extreme stretch of logistical support confronting the Allied Forces, a great deal of latitude must be afforded the field commanders in the conduct of combat operations at both a tactical and strategic level. The overall concept of Operation Market-Garden was if not brilliant, certainly unique. As regards the planning and execution, it can be said, "the devil was in the details". Unfortunately those details contained in a seemingly obscure pamphlet of the British Army, in the opinion of the author, were categorically ignored and violated. The elements, which appear to have substantially contributed to this disregard, are in nominal ranked order of importance as follows:

• Violation of basic axioms of airborne warfare by senior commanders (specifically multiple lifts versus a single lift thus dividing the mass of the1st Airborne Division, and losing the element of surprise for follow-on elements.)
• The lack of knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of airborne troops, and/or the application of that knowledge, by senior commanders (specifically the selection of DZs and LZs of excessive distance from the division's objective, given its inherent limited mobility. Taken in combination with multiple lifts the two factors produced a compound negative effect.)
• The inordinate egos and inflexibility of senior commanders (this factor permeated the entire planning process)
• The repeated abject rejection of critical intelligence by senior commanders
• Total disregard of advice and counsel from combat proven airborne commanders by senior commanders
• Lack of interoperability between the Airborne Forces and the RAF and USAAF Troop Carrier Commands
• Disregard for the resilience, defensive operational capabilities and tactical improvisation of German Forces by senior commanders
• The momentum of combat operations

Taken in totality the compounded errors were overwhelming, if not synergistic to a negative effect, in guaranteeing failure. It is only at the top that commanders, and as importantly their staffs, can integrate all the requisite elements of victory. When it is achieved it is the commander who receives the laurels; conversely in failure he has to take the mantle of responsibility. In the case of Operation Market-Garden it is my personal opinion that Field Marshal Montgomery and Lieut-General Browning failed on both counts.

[Whitehall_Bin_Men]

Obelisks, human sacrifice, British establishment #WWII conspiracies.
The Da Vinci Code of Arnhem has it all:
Market Garden, Destined To Fail: Rob van der Zon + Marco Verhej: #Bilderberg & @WeAreChangeRdam
#PeterBorenius
https://facebook.com/groups/195913074082429?view=permalink&id=73686806 3320258

[TonyGosling]

Sean O'Sullivan 21 hours ago

There is a hell of a lot more to operation market garden than the movie A Bridge Too Far, its quite innacurate in places, even the book has them. This is pretty long winded but that is necessary to address the many misconceptions.

Here's an overview of why market garden came about, and its implementation, quotes included from several primary source's.

Montgomery's original plan was operation Comet and he and Dempsy wanted to go for Wesel but Brereton said it was too near the Rhur flak belt, the airborne commanders suggested Arnhem, this was also supported by the high command as it would deal with the V2 problem, as the plan for XXX Corps was to go beyond Arnhem to the Ijsselmere, or Zuidersee as it was formally known. This would have the added effect of cutting off the 15th Army currently in the Scheldt. Let's not forget the airborne comanders were very keen on it too, and it was them that planned the entire airborne side of the operation not Montgomery, there had been 16 drops cancelled between the 6th of June and the 10th of September, they were keen on this to go ahead. Eisenhower was in favour of Operation Market Garden as both Generals Marshall and Hap Arnold wanted a major airborne offensive before the end of the war. Here is what Forrest C Pogue official US historian of Eisenhower's headquarters at SHAEF had to say about the reason it was given the go ahead.

"It seemed to fit the pattern of current Allied strategy. It conformed to General Arnold's recommendation for an operation some distance east of the enemy's forward positions and beyond the area where enemy reserves were normally located; it afforded an opportunity for using the long-idle airborne resources; it was in accord with Field Marshal Montgomery's desire for a thrust north of the Rhine while the enemy was disorganized; it would help reorient the Allied drive in the direction 21 Army Group thought it should go; and it appeared to General Eisenhower to be the boldest and best move the Allies could make at the moment. The Supreme Commander realized that the momentum of the drive into Germany was being lost and thought that by this action it might be possible to get a bridgehead across the Rhine before the Allies were stopped. The airborne divisions, he knew, were in good condition and could be supported without throwing a crushing burden on the already overstrained supply lines. At worst, General Eisenhower thought the operation would strengthen the 21 Army Group in its later fight to clear the Schelde estuary. Field Marshal Montgomery examined the objections that the proposed route of advance "involved the additional obstacle of the Lower Rhine ... as compared with more easterly approaches, and would carry us to an area relatively remote from the Ruhr." He considered that these were overridden by certain major advantages: (1) the operation would outflank the Siegfried Line defenses; (2) it would be on the line which the enemy would consider the least likely for the Allies to use; and (3) the area was the one with the easiest range for the Allied airborne forces"

As for the reasons for the operations failure, despite all the other problems, it was the lack of priority given to Nijmagen bridge that sounded its death knell. The first elements of XXX Corps crossed the Grave bridge just outside Nijmagen at 8.20am on the 19th of september thats around 40 hours after setting off, and around 10 miles from Arnhem, Frost still held the north end of Arnhem bridge, and would until the 21st. The problem was that Nijmagen bridge wasn't taken on day one, Gavin and Browning had re prioritized the Groezbeek hights over their main objective the Waal bridge which was barely defended on day one, Gavin only sent A and B companies of 508th into Nijmagen (one of which got lost on the way). The A Company arrived at the bridge about 10pm just as SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Viktor Graebners 9th ss panzer recon battalion turned up with lead elements of the 10th ss panzers engineers and some artillery plus some troops.

As John frost says...
"By far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there by courtesy of rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.”

John Frost blamed Browning but he was unaware that it was Gavin's idea to prioritise the Groezbeek hights, as Gavin said when questioned in the aftermath.

"The decision was mine and approved by my corps commander, Browning."

I will concede that Browning's presence may have had the effect of clouding Gavin's judgement, as in many ways, Browning was more of a distraction and hindrance than help and certainly contributed NOTHING to the overall command. Also, his decision to set up his HQ on the Heights robbed 1st Para of 36 additional transports and given what happened, how much more useful would they have been?

Though the 2nd SS panzer corps were present, again the fact is Montgomery found out at the last minute. Badell Smith was given the reports of the 9th and 10th ss panzers on the 16th of September he flew to Brussels to inform Montgomery, but it was less than 24 hours, at best, before the operation started.

Both the 9th and 10th ss divisions were seriously mauled, and at 1/3rd strength. Neither were at Arnhem but the 9th were at Zutphen 20 miles north of Arnhem, and the 10th were around Ruurlo almost 30 miles from Arnhem, not based at Arnhem as is oft said. The 10th had virtually no armour and very little transport, but the 9th had 2 assault gun batteries, and a company of MkV Panthers plus the recon battalion (which Frosts battalion destroyed on Arnhem bridge). While these units were a nightmare for the British at Arnhem, as you can see there were not 2 fully equipped Panzer divisions as people make out. They had been reinforced AFTER 1st Para had secured one end of the bridge, effectively denying it to the Germans at that point (as can be seen by photos of the devastating carnage that they inflicted on the recon battalion).

As for XXX Corp not progressing beyond Nijmegen, there were only a handful of tanks that had crossed Nijmegen Bridge, with the bulk of the British forces (including their supporting infantry) were still with the bulk of 82 Airborne still cleaning up the pockets of resistance in Nijmegen itself. Had Gavin taken the bridge when it was all but undefended, they would have prevented the Germans from crossing (given that there is no reason to suspect that they were any less capable than Frost's team in Arnhem, and their subsequent actions in battle prove that they certainly had the courage and ability to perform exceptionally well in combat.) Given that there was no supporting infantry and only a few tanks, the decision NOT to proceed to Arnhem was the correct one, as the tanks without support would have been easy pickings for any German units.

The Germans assessment of Market Garden was it was a good plan. Its main failings, in their opinion, was only one drop per day. This was Maj General Paul L Williams' and Lewis Brereton's decision, and as for the drop zones too far away, these were dictated by the USAAF transport command; the RAF operated the glider tugs (although I have read accounts that also implicate RAF command in the decision of the drop zones, too, especially given that the Poles were landed subsequently in exactly the spot where RAF had previously said it was too dangerous to drop!!!)

I'll leave the last words to Eisenhower:-

"I not only approved market garden, I insisted on it".

comment from here
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50ogHjrQFBE

[TonyGosling]

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