ian neal
Angel - now passed away
Joined: 26 Jul 2005
Posts: 3140
Location: UK
|
 Posted: Tue Nov 28, 2006 1:47 pm Post subject: |
 |
|
Back on subject, you are right Thermate to highlight the more mundane evidence (compared to some of the evidence cited by the 9/11 truth movement) of Bush and Blair's war criminality
The following is taken from the Impeach Blair report is powerful stuff. The only problem with this approach is the danger that the great British public will accept Blair is a traitor and war criminal and once he is removed / imprsoned, believe that this is the end of it, whereas the reality is that a change in leader or government will change nothing of substance
Making a secret agreement with President Bush to remove Saddam Hussein by force if necessary
201. The evidence available to the public strongly indicates that the Prime Minister understood that the United States was planning to invade Iraq from late 2001, unless Saddam Hussein was deposed through other means; that he made a decision to support the United States in this action during the course of mid-2002; and that he used the claims about Iraq's weapons and about non-cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors throughout this period as a way to win support from the public and other countries. In effect, the Prime Minister had committed the UK to assist the
US with the invasion of Iraq, but had not disclosed this commitment to Parliament, to his own Cabinet or to the British public. It may be that there is evidence that has not yet been disclosed which would call this interpretation into question. However, the failure of the Prime Minister to provide informative denials to the statements of senior and respected officials indicates that the accounts of these individuals are true.
202. According to Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador to the United States, the Prime Minister was aware that the US would invade Iraq during the term of the first Bush administration from 20 September 2001. The Prime Minister and President Bush had dinner on that date at the White House, which Meyer also attended. Meyer's account was contained in an article in Vanity Fair:108
"On Thursday, September 20, Tony Blair arrived in Washington for a meeting at the White House. Until now, many assumed his and Bush's early talks had been limited to the coming war in Afghanistan. In fact, they also spoke of Iraq.
At a dinner in the White House, attended also by Colin Powell, Condi Rice,
and the British ambassador to the United States, Sir Christopher Meyer, Bush made clear that he was determined to topple Saddam. 'Rumors were already flying that Bush would use 9/11 as a pretext to attack Iraq,' Meyer remembers.
'On the one hand, Blair came with a very strong message-don't get distracted; the priorities were al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, the Taliban. Bush said, "I agree with you, Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq."'"
203. On 29 January 2002, President Bush declared in his State of the Union address that Iraq was part of an "axis of evil". This was followed up by explicit commitments in public to effect a change in the Iraqi leadership.
On 4 April 2002, he told British journalist Trevor Macdonald:109
"I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go. That's about all I'm willing to share with you. […] I'm confident that we can lead a coalition to pressure Saddam Hussein and to deal with Saddam Hussein."
204. This was followed up by President Bush's statement at a press conference with Tony Blair in Crawford, Texas on 6 April 2002. He said:110
"I explained to the Prime Minister that the policy of my government is the
removal of Saddam and that all options are on the table."
205. Thus it was clear to the Prime Minister that the United States government was intent on bringing about a change in the Iraqi leadership. Thus if internal coup attempts failed, and if Saddam Hussein could not be coerced into leaving the country, the Prime Minister could expect that an invasion of Iraq by US forces would follow.
206. The evidence strongly indicates that the response of the British government to these developments was to give its support to the objectives of the Bush administration. Firstly, the Prime Minister gave his clear verbal support to the approach of President Bush. On 7 April 2002, the day after President Bush had said that his government's policy was to remove Saddam Hussein, Mr Blair said in a prepared speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library:111
"when America is fighting for those values, then, however tough, we fight
with her. No grandstanding, no offering implausible but impractical advice
from the comfort of the touchline, no wishing away the hard not the easy
choices on terrorism and WMD, or making peace in the Middle East, but
working together, side by side. [...] If the world makes the right choices now - at this time of destiny - we will get there. And Britain will be at America's side in doing it."
207. Secondly, in the months immediately after this statement, British military personnel commenced meetings with US personnel to plan an invasion of Iraq. Air Marshal Brian Burridge, the national contingent commander for Operation Telic (the invasion of Iraq), told the House of Commons Defence Select Committee on 11 June 2003 that this planning began in "early in June or July" of 2002.112 He also described the reason for the planning process:113
"We began looking at Iraq planning in the summer. We had no timetable, but it was put to me that if the UK was at any stage likely to participate, then best we at least understand the planning and influence the planning for the better.
At no stage did we say "Here is the end date by which we are going to do
this". What we did have was a couple of windows. We said ideally it makes
sense either to do this in the spring of 2003 or autumn of 2003."
208. Whilst contingency planning is not to be confused with the political decision to invade, it is clear that at this stage the British government was choosing to participate in a planning process that it knew the US administration had already committed itself to implementing, if other methods of removing Saddam Hussein did not succeed.
209. Thirdly, the changed policy towards Iraq was reflected in interdepartmental advice given to ministers in March 2002. The first in the list of the "current objectives towards Iraq" was:114
"the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq, which does not possess WMD or
threaten its neighbours, into the international community. Implicitly, this
cannot occur with Saddam in power"
210. Thus from March 2002, the British government recognised that its objective should be removal of Saddam Hussein from power. As interdepartmental advice from March 2002 recognised, this would likely require military force:115
"In sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international community."
211. However, this advice from March 2002 also recognised at "offensive military action against Iraq could only be justified if Iraq were held to be in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687". Therefore, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and at least nine of all its members, would need to concur that Iraq had committed such a breach. This could only be achieved under three possible conditions:116
"They would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its obligations regarding WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity. Current intelligence is
insufficiently robust to meet this criterion...
Or If P5 unity could be obtained, Iraq refused to readmit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by the UN Security Council. or The UN inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence of WMD activity or were again expelled trying to do so."
212. Therefore, the only way in which the British government recognised that it could justify an invasion of Iraq would be to use the United Nations weapons inspectors to provide a pretext for an invasion. The evidence indicates that the Prime Minister recognised that the work of UNMOVIC to verify Iraq's disarmament would not be allowed to substitute for an invasion.
213. In July 2002, the Prime Minister had a 15-minute conversation with President Bush; a senior US official from the Vice-President's office who read a transcript of this conversation gave Vanity Fair a description of its contents:117
"The way it read was that, come what may, Saddam was going to go; they said they were going forward, they were going to take out the regime, and they were doing the right thing. Blair did not need any convincing. There was no, 'Come on, Tony, we've got to get you on board'. I remember reading it and then thinking, OK, now I know what we're going to be doing for the next year. [...] it was a done deal."
214. The Butler report gives the strong indication that the British government accepted that this "done deal" was for the UK to engage with presentational activity and give its military support, in return for which President Bush would enable the Prime Minister to use the weapons inspectors as a pretext.
215. The Butler report recorded that at the 6 April 2002 Crawford meeting, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed "the need for effective presentational activity",118 namely:119
"The importance of presentational activity on Iraq's breaches (and other issues) to persuade other members of the United Nations Security Council as well as domestic audiences of the case for action to enforce disarmament."
216. That the reintroduction of weapons inspectors could serve as a pretext for military action was a consistent theme of US-UK planning over the next months:120
"The role of the United Nations - in building an international consensus on the need for action to tackle Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes; in the reengagement of inspectors to investigate the extent and scale of those programmes; and ultimately in providing legitimacy for any military action to enforce disarmament - was discussed further at a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State Powell at a meeting at the Hamptons, New York, on 20 August 2002,and between the Prime Minister and the President at Camp David on 7 September 2002. It is clear from the departmental papers we have seen that the UK championed the role of the United Nations at that meeting."
217. The nature of the 7 September 2002 meeting between the Prime Minister and President Bush was explained in more detail in Bob Woodward's book, Plan of Attack, which was written with the compliance of the White House:121
On the morning of Sept. 7, 2002, Blair left London on a transatlantic flight to see Bush at Camp David. In Blair's conversations with Bush, it was
increasingly clear to the prime minister how committed Bush was to action. […] Bush looked Blair in the eye. "Saddam Hussein is a threat. And we must work together to deal with this threat, and the world will be better off without him."
Bush recalled that he was "probing" and "pushing" the Prime Minister. He said it might require - would probably entail - war. Blair might have to send British troops. "I'm with you," the Prime Minister replied, looking Bush back in the eye, pledging flat out to commit British military force if necessary, the critical promise Bush had been seeking.
218. There is no indication that this pledge by the Prime Minister to commit British military forces was conditional upon non-compliance with UN weapons inspectors. The US President had committed his administration to removing Saddam Hussein, come what may. This might not require an invasion to achieve, although President Bush recognised it probably would. Thus the Prime Minister was committing British forces to an invasion, except in the unlikely event that Saddam Hussein would be ousted by other means before that invasion took place.
219. These commitments given by the Prime Minister to the US President were not revealed to his cabinet, to Parliament or to the public. In fact, the Prime Minister repeatedly said that no decisions had yet been taken. The Prime Minister's assurances to a member of his Cabinet were recorded in the diary of former International Development Secretary Clare Short:122
"On 26 July [2002], she wrote, she raised her 'simmering worry about Iraq' in a meeting with Blair. She wanted a debate on Iraq in the next Cabinet meeting, but he said it was unnecessary because 'it would get hyped.... He said nothing decided and wouldn't be over summer.' […]
As late as 9 September, Short's diary records, 'T[ony] B[lair] gave me
assurances when I asked for Iraq to be discussed at Cabinet that no decision made and not imminent.'"
220. To the public and Parliament, the Prime Minister continued to emphasise that he had not committed himself to changing the Iraqi leadership. On 25 February 2003, he told the House of Commons:123
"I detest his regime. But even now he can save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve
disarmament peacefully."
221. If any of the accounts quoted above from Bob Woodward, Vanity Fair or the Butler report are accurate, it was not true that no decision had been taken by the Prime Minister. In fact, these accounts strongly indicate that by 9 September 2002, Mr Blair had agreed to commit British forces in support of US troops if they were to invade Iraq. The Prime Minister has not provided any information to discredit these accounts.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Prime Minister had made a secret alliance to go to war by 9 September 2002, and that his subsequent presentation of material on Iraq's NBC weapons were an attempt to win public and international support for a predetermined policy outcome.
108 Bryan Burrough et al., "The path to war", Vanity Fair, May 2004, p.110.
109 Transcript at: http://usinfo.org/USIA/usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02040502.ht m
110 http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1711.asp
111 http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1712.asp
112 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/57 /3061104.htm
113 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/57 /3061103.htm
114 Quoted in the Butler report, §260.
115 Quoted in the Butler report, §268.
116 Quoted in the Butler report, §267.
117 Bryan Burrough et al., "The path to war", Vanity Fair, May 2004, p.172.
118 Butler report, §286.
119 Butler report, §269.
120 Butler report, §288.
121 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, Simon & Schuster, 2004.
122 Bryan Burrough et al., "The path to war", Vanity Fair, May 2004, p.172.
123 http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3088.asp |
|
FAQ
Search
Memberlist
Chat
Usergroups
Calendar
Register
Profile
Log in to check your private messages
Log in
