Straw vetoes Iraq minutes release

[simplesimon]

Justice Secretary Jack Straw has vetoed the publication of minutes of key Cabinet meetings held in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003.

He said he would use a clause in the Freedom of Information Act to block the release of details of meetings in which the war's legality was discussed.

Releasing the papers would do "serious damage" to Cabinet government, he said, and outweighed public interest needs.

The Information Tribunal ruled last month that they should be published.

'Necessary'

They had rejected a government appeal against the Information Commissioner's ruling that the papers be published because decisions taken in the run-up to 2003 invasion of Iraq were "momentous" and controversial.

The government could have appealed against the Information Tribunal's decision in the High Court, but has decided instead to use the ministerial veto for the first time since the Freedom of Information laws came into force.

Mr Straw told MPs that he had not taken the decision to block the minutes "lightly" but that it was "necessary" in the interest of protecting Cabinet government.

"There is a balance to be struck between openness and maintaining aspects of our structure of democratic government."

The Conservatives said the decision was "right" since the release of the minutes would make ministers more reluctant to discuss controversial subjects in future, impeding good government.

However, shadow justice secretary Dominic Grieve said the way the government had handled the issue betrayed its contempt for the FOI legislation it itself introduced.

He also repeated his call for a full-scale public inquiry into the Iraq war, saying the need for this was now "overwhelming".


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7907991.stm

[fish5133]

[Thermate911]

Who cares what Straw attempts anymore. He is and has demonstrably acted as a criminal, and not just against Craig Murray! Straw's sounding more and more like Dick Cheney.

No harm in reminding and/or pointing out to newcomers that the guts of those memos have been public domain for sometime now:-

http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html
wherein:-

• As originally reported in the The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

[QuitTheirClogs]

[TonyGosling]

They're all in it together, a sea of stooges and a handful of weak compromised people. Criminals. Tory stooges justifying Labour stooges.
Imagine, Rothschild agent Mandelson in the middle of a LABOUR cabinet. It's a bad joke.
Rothschild and the city calling the tune day after day, legislation after legislation. Robber barons smashing the country to pieces ready for a Hitlerian figure, Cameron?, to be hailed as the saviour.
Lords of Misrule bringing Order from Chaos.

[Thermate911]

A very bad joke indeed.

Here's a semi-retired Lord of Misrule waffling his rrrrs off today... (funny how Straw and Hague appeal to CiF commenters ;)


Lift this cloud of secrecy

The government must be open about its role in Binyam Mohamed's Guantánamo ordeal
Comments (54)

o William Hague
o The Guardian, Saturday 28 February 2009


This week Binyam Mohamed was released from Guantánamo Bay and transferred to the UK. Far from ending speculation, his return has inflamed rumours about what he endured since his capture in 2002. Mohamed has overnight become the symbol of the ugly practices that he has allegedly been subjected to. He blames Britain for being complicit in his ordeal, saying that "the very people who I had hoped would come to my rescue allied themselves with my abusers".

These are serious allegations. Torture is abhorrent and unacceptable, and for Britain to be associated with such practices, even at the level of unproven allegations, damages our reputation and our standing in the world. For Britain to clear its name, the government needs to be as transparent as possible about what happened to Mohamed, so that the British public, British officials and British allies know that this country does not connive, collude or participate in torture.

What stands between the accusations made by Mohamed and the truth about the role British officials may have played in his case are the so-called "redacted paragraphs" containing details of his detention. According to the court, they give Mohamed an "arguable case" that he was subjected to torture or "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment".

The government's response to events has been confused. On the one hand it was the foreign secretary, David Miliband, who acted to stop the British courts publishing these paragraphs, invoking the principles of intelligence-sharing between Britain and the US and a threat to national security. On the other, it emerges that the foreign office solicited a letter from the Bush administration to back up this claim. Now, in the face of a public outcry, Miliband says he has no objection to the information in the paragraphs coming to light.

Blah blah compassionless blah - rest at:-
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/27/binyam-mohamed

[QuitTheirClogs]

REVEALED: 'There was no Cabinet debate in run-up to war,' says Short as Government refuses to release minutes

By Simon Walters -- 28th February 2009
Daily Mail

The Government is refusing to release minutes of Cabinet meetings before the Iraq War because they would reveal there was no discussion on the issue. Details surrounding two crucial meetings on the eve of the conflict were laid bare for the first time yesterday when former Cabinet Minister Clare Short, who was present at both, gave a full account of what happened. She told The Mail on Sunday the main reason for the ‘scandalous’ decision not to publish the minutes was not to protect confidential discussions about the war, but to cover up the fact there was no such discussion.

The meeting on March 17 was called to discuss Attorney General Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the legality of the war.

Ms Short said: ‘When we arrived, there was a piece of paper in front of each of us, a few paragraphs written by the Attorney General saying the war was legal, there were no problems etc.

‘Lord Goldsmith started reading it out but we said, “You don’t have to, we can read it.” Then Tony said something like, “That’s it.” And that was it.

‘I wanted to know if the Attorney General had any doubts about the legality of the war.

‘They all said, “Clare, be quiet, stop.” No one else wanted to talk about it. I was shouted down.’

[TonyGosling]

I'm reminded of one of the best documentary TV series' ever called Secret Society by Duncan Campbell produced by Brian Barr for the BBC.
In one of the episodes on Secret Cabinet Committees Campbell explains how all the pomp and ceremony is nothing but a charade.
All the big decisions being made through 'reccomendations' that come from secret cabinet committees (membership names also secret to most of the cabinet) with thrilling names like 'Misc. 7'
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjH13l-bFak
About time a bunch of filmmakers got together to produce a Secret Society series for the 21st Century.

[TonyGosling]

being a bit boring here (for a change eh?) and copying the entire text of this massively significant article - in terms of the rule of law. Clearly a man's reputation now counts for nothing in government.

REVEALED: 'There was no Cabinet debate in run-up to war,' says Short as Government refuses to release minutes

By Simon Walters
Last updated at 10:18 AM on 01st March 2009

The Government is refusing to release minutes of Cabinet meetings before the Iraq War because they would reveal there was no discussion on the issue.

Details surrounding two crucial meetings on the eve of the conflict were laid bare for the first time yesterday when former Cabinet Minister Clare Short, who was present at both, gave a full account of what happened.

She told The Mail on Sunday the main reason for the ‘scandalous’ decision not to publish the minutes was not to protect confidential discussions about the war, but to cover up the fact there was no such discussion.

At the last Cabinet meeting, no debate on the legality of the war was allowed and Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, said brusquely: ‘That’s it.’

The official records would also put an end to claims by Gordon Brown’s supporters that, in private, he had grave doubts about the war, said Ms Short. In fact, he led the Cabinet campaign to accuse France of sabotaging British and American attempts to win United Nations support for the attack on Saddam Hussein.

‘It is extraordinary when you hear people like Jack Straw say that the Cabinet minutes cannot be published because you have to preserve Cabinet confidentiality and robust decision-making,’ said Ms Short, who resigned as International Development Secretary after the war.

‘The bitter irony is that what they are doing is concealing the fact there was no robust decision-making. The minutes will reveal there was no real Cabinet discussion about the Iraq War. That is the real scandal.’

Ms Short spoke out after the Government blocked an order by the Information Commissioner to reveal minutes of Cabinet meetings on March 13 and March 17, 2003, two days before the war started on March 19.

She said: ‘Gordon had been completely marginalised in the run-up to the war. It wasn’t because he didn’t support it but because he and Tony were not getting on. Then, John Prescott had a dinner and knocked their heads together.’

The meeting on March 17 was called to discuss Attorney General Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the legality of the war.

Ms Short said: ‘When we arrived, there was a piece of paper in front of each of us, a few paragraphs written by the Attorney General saying the war was legal, there were no problems etc.

‘Lord Goldsmith started reading it out but we said, “You don’t have to, we can read it.” Then Tony said something like, “That’s it.” And that was it.

‘I wanted to know if the Attorney General had any doubts about the legality of the war.

‘They all said, “Clare, be quiet, stop.” No one else wanted to talk about it. I was shouted down.’


The truth is a stranger to nu labour.
Blairs crimes should be heard in court.
What a Disgrace..