Shoestring Trustworthy Freedom Fighter
Joined: 25 Jul 2006 Posts: 325
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Posted: Fri Sep 28, 2007 9:28 pm Post subject: The Navy Jets That Never Arrived on 9/11 |
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Here's some details about 9/11 you've probably not seen before, from my latest blog entry. It's posted here:
http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2007/09/navy-jets-that-never-arrived -on-911.html
and http://www.911blogger.com/node/11703
The Navy Jets That Never Arrived on 9/11
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "On 9/11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)." NORAD in particular is tasked with defending the airspace over North America and protecting the continent. The attacks on 9/11 all took place within its Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), which, according to the 9/11 Commission, was able to call upon two 'alert' military sites for assistance: Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia. Each of these had just one pair of fighter jets at the ready. "Other facilities, not on 'alert,' would need time to arm the fighters and organize crews." [1]
This implied that the most sophisticated military in all history believed that four fighter aircraft was sufficient to defend 500,000 square miles of airspace and the 80 million people covered by it. However, there is good evidence that--as we would rationally expect--this was not the case at all, and the military had other lines of defense it could have called upon. One possibility totally ignored by the 9/11 Commission was that the Navy could have provided fighter jets to help defend America during the attacks of September 11.
RUDY WASHINGTON CALLS FOR HELP
The New York Daily News has reported: "Rudy Washington, one of Rudy Giuliani's deputy mayors on Sept. 11, 2001, ran New York for the first few hours after the attack." As he was being driven into downtown Manhattan after the first attack occurred, Washington saw the smoking North Tower and right away requested air defense over New York. He "immediately called Admiral Robert Natter, commander of the Atlantic Fleet." Natter was based at the Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia, which is the world's largest naval base. Washington asked for air cover for the city. Natter "said he had to get in touch with NORAD and would call back." [2]
Right away, we have an important point to observe: When Rudy Washington wanted fighter jets over New York, he did not call NORAD, the FAA, the Air Force, or the Pentagon. The first place he turned to for help was the Navy. So he must have believed it was able to provide the kind of assistance that was required in the current crisis. What kind of support might the Navy have offered, then? Norfolk Naval Station is in the region of Naval Air Station Oceana. NAS Oceana's primary mission is "to train and deploy the Navy's fighter/attack squadron--the F-14 Tomcats and the F/A-18 Hornets." [3] At that time, twelve F-14 Tomcat fighter squadrons and eleven F/A-18 Hornet squadrons were based there. In total, there were 300 fighter jets. [4] These should have been a useful asset for dealing with emergencies, such as an aerial attack on the United States.
It is unclear exactly how long it took Admiral Natter to get the permission he sought from NORAD. At some time after the second WTC tower was hit (i.e. after 9:03 a.m.), Rudy Washington called Patrick Burns, who was at Norfolk Naval Station for his two-week Naval Reserve obligation. Among other things, he wanted to know about the status of the Navy jets. [5] Obviously, there was no sign of them yet having arrived over New York. Washington communicated with Natter again from City Hall, apparently fairly soon after the first WTC tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m. Natter said he had now received permission from NORAD to send some planes over New York. How long exactly it had taken him to get this permission is unspecified. [6] Also unspecified is what time the Navy jets were launched, and when--if at all--they reached New York. In describing events right after the second attack, Patrick Burns has claimed: "Air cover was already up with Navy jets out of Naval Air Station Oceana." [7] Yet the first fighters to arrive over New York were apparently two F-15s launched by NEADS from Otis Air Force Base. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, these arrived at 9:25 a.m. [8] In fact, the majority of witnesses on the ground have recalled first noticing fighter jets overhead at some time after 10 a.m. [9]
THE NAVY COMMAND CENTER TRIES TO HELP
Further evidence that the Navy had the capability to provide fighters to protect the U.S. is the fact that individuals working in its Command Center were trying to get jets launched just before the Pentagon was attacked. Though it has not been stated explicitly, one would assume that, since they worked for the Navy, these men would have been calling upon Navy jets to help.
The Navy Command Center was located on the first floor of the Pentagon's southwest face. Inside it, Matthew Flocco, Edward Earhart, and their supervisor Nancy McKeown--all members of a small meteorological unit there--were watching the TV footage of the attacks in New York. McKeown reportedly asked Flocco and Earhart to bring up New York on the computer, because the Command Center was going to send some fighter jets there in case there was another attack on the city. She also told them to program weather updates for military aircraft converging on New York. [10] Another person in the Command Center was Ronald Vauk, the Navy's watch commander. Just before the Pentagon was hit, he was urgently trying to get fighter jets launched, reportedly to protect Washington, DC. [11] Tragically, except for McKeown, all of these individuals were killed just seconds later. The Navy Command Center was mostly destroyed when the Pentagon was hit at 9:37. [12]
THE DELAYED REACTIONS OF VERN CLARK
The Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark has recalled his actions in response to the attacks: "We had carriers at sea. I talked to Admiral Natter and Admiral Fargo [Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet] about immediate loadouts [of weapons and armed aircraft] and the positioning of our air defense cruisers. Fundamentally, those pieces were in place almost immediately and integrated into the interagency process and with the FAA." This again indicated that the Navy was capable of rapidly providing air defense over the U.S.: the "immediate loadouts" of "armed aircraft." Clark explained: "There has never been an experience like this in my lifetime. We were thinking about the immediate protection of the United States of America." [13]
But what time was he describing? 8:15 a.m., just after Flight 11 broke radio contact with controllers? 8:20, when it veered drastically off course? 8:25, when the air traffic controller was sure he was dealing with a hijacking? [14] Apparently not. Clark seems to have been referring to the period after the Pentagon attack at 9:37. Until then, he had been in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon. No reports describe him doing anything in response to the attacks in New York. When the Pentagon was hit, he was "receiving a budget briefing." A member of his staff then entered the office and told him he had to evacuate. After initially heading to the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC), he decided to re-establish the Navy's command center in another location in Washington, DC. [15] Presumably it was some time after he arrived at this new command center that he began "thinking about the immediate protection of the United States of America."
In his recollection, Clark referred to the Navy's air defense cruisers. The aircraft carrier USS George Washington, which is based at Norfolk, was at sea off the Virginia coast that morning, conducting training exercises. It was dispatched to New York, "following the recovery of armed F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets from Naval Air Station Oceana." [16] Yet, none of these fighters appear to have been of any use in stopping the attacks.
READINESS IS THE NAME OF THE GAME
To conclude, the U.S. Navy had many fighter jets available in the northeastern United States. Deputy Mayor Rudy Washington had requested some of these apparently minutes after 8:46, when the first attack took place. Yet it is unclear whether any Navy jets ever arrived over New York. They were certainly not there by 10 a.m. If they did arrive, it was only after the attacks had ended.
In spite of the Navy's therefore disastrous failure to protect the United States on 9/11, Admiral Robert Natter later commented: "I think we were responsive to something that came out of the clear blue, and I think naval forces reacted to it the way the taxpayers would have wanted. Readiness is the name of the game, and the ability of our people to respond is the second part of it." [17]
NOTES
[1] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Authorized Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 14 and 16-17.
[2] "Aboard the USS Vela Gulf." CBS News, April 3, 2003; Stanley Crouch, "Forgotten Man of 9/11 Played Enormous Role." New York Daily News, May 20, 2004.
[3] Roger Richards, "Under Attack." Digital Journalist, October 2001; "Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana." GlobalSecurity.org, November 15, 2001.
[4] "History of Naval Air Station Oceana." Naval Air Station Oceana, April 3, 2001; "Vital Statistics." Naval Air Station Oceana, April 3, 2001.
[5] Patrick Burns, "Called to Ground Zero." Notre Dame Magazine, Spring 2007.
[6] Stanley Crouch, "Forgotten Man of 9/11 Played Enormous Role."
[7] Patrick Burns, "Called to Ground Zero."
[8] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 24.
[9] See "(9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Witnesses First Notice Military Jets Over New York, Later Than Claimed by 9/11 Commission." Complete 9/11 Timeline.
[10] Malcolm McConnell, "Brick by Brick." Reader's Digest, September 2002; "Stories of 9/11." Larry King Weekend, CNN, September 8, 2002.
[11] Francis X. Clines, "Perseverance, Not Vindictiveness, in a Family Bereaved by Terrorism." New York Times, November 17, 2001; Scott Shane, "9/11: One Year." Baltimore Sun, September 11, 2002.
[12] Richard Leiby, "The Last Watch." Washington Post, January 20, 2002.
[13] Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.' Readiness Improvements Prove Critical in War on Terrorism, But Future Navy is at Risk." Sea Power, January 2002.
[14] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 18-19; Tom Brokaw, "The Skies Over America." NBC News, September 9, 2006.
[15] Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'"
[16] Allen G. Breed, "In South, Shock, Fear Over Terrorist Attacks Put Life on Hold." Associated Press, September 12, 2001; Jack Dorsey, "Navy Carriers Sent to Patrol off New York, DC." Virginian-Pilot, September 12, 2001; Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again'"; Patrick Burns, "Called to Ground Zero."
[17] Gordon I. Peterson, "Bush: 'The Might of Our Navy is Needed Again.'" _________________ http://www.shoestring911.blogspot.com |
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blackcat Validated Poster
Joined: 07 May 2006 Posts: 2376
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Posted: Thu Jun 26, 2008 10:46 am Post subject: |
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http://dnotice.org/
Quote: | From the Department for Transport, June 25, 2008
The Thirty-Four Minute Gap
"[If the Air Traffic Control Center sector] has no datablock or other information on it, the military will usually scramble an intercept flight. Essentially always they turn out to be private pilots… not talking to anybody, who stray too far outside the boundary, then get picked up on their way back in. But, procedures are procedures, and they will likely find two F-18s on their tail within 10 or so minutes." -- Air Traffic Control Center, ‘ATCC Controller’s Read Binder’, Xavier Software, August 1998.
On October 25, 1999 at 09:19 EDT a Learjet Model 35, registration N47BA, departed Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida bound for Dallas-Love Field, Dallas, Texas with four passengers on board, including U.S. Open golf champion Payne Stewart.1 After several radio exchanges with Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (JARTCC), JARTCC at 09:33 EDT instructed N47BA to change radio frequencies and contact another JARTCC controller. There was no reply. Approximately four hours later the Learjet, off course, nose-dived into the open marshy fields of Edmunds, South Dakota, killing all on board.
Before the crash of the Learjet there ensued a curious four-hour chase conducted by the United States Air Force and units of the Air National Guard (ANG). After several intercepts and pullbacks by military interceptors, the lead pilot of a pair of Oklahoma ANG F-16s maneuvered along side Stewart’s Learjet for a close-up inspection. The pilot reported, "It's looking like the cockpit window is iced over".2 Payne Stewart’s Learjet, it seems, had lost pressurization, killing all on board.
Just as curious was the NTSB Aircraft Accident Brief3 on the tragedy that was adopted three weeks after George W. Bush’s election in 2000, and thirteen months after the crash. The timeline the NTSB provided of the Air Force response to the off course Learjet not only contradicted the initial media reports’ of the Air Force’s own timeline of the crash, but conspicuously omitted one critical entry on the Air Force’s response.
The NTSB timeline on the Air Force’s response begins at 09:52 CDT, one-hour and eighteen minutes after JARTCC lost contact with the craft:
"About 0952 CDT, a USAF F-16 test pilot from the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, was vectored to within 8 nm of N47BA. About 0954 CDT, at a range of 2,000 feet from the accident airplane and an altitude of about 46,400 feet, the test pilot made two radio calls to N47BA but did not receive a response. About 1000 CDT, the test pilot began a visual inspection of N47BA."4
The published media accounts of the Air Force’s timeline paints an altogether different sequence of events for the Air Force’s response, and takes note of another aspect of the Air Force’s response that for some reason the NTSB was reluctant to report on.
ABC News.com on October 25th reported:
"According to an Air Force summary, after contact was initially lost, two F-15s from Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., were sent to track the Learjet. The F-15s pulled back and two F-16s in the air from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., moved in to track the aircraft."5
The Dallas Morning News on October 26th reported:
"Instead, according to an Air Force timeline, a series of military planes provided an emergency escort to the stricken Lear, beginning with a pair of F-16 Falcons from the Air National Guard at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., about 20 minutes after ground controllers lost contact. An F-16 and an A-10 Warthog attack plane from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., took up the chase a few minutes later and were trailing the Lear when it climbed abruptly from 39,000 to 44,000 feet at 9:52 a.m. CDT.
Fifteen minutes later, the F-16 intercepted the Lear, the pilot reporting no movement in the cockpit."6
Note the dissimilarities between the Air Force’s timeline and the NTSB’s timeline. The NTSB timeline altogether avoids mentioning an earlier request for assistance to a pair of F-15s from Tyndall Air Force Base, who we learn were actually escorting the Learjet twenty minutes after JARTCC lost contact with it. Now if we say it took five minutes to alert the Eglin fighters once the Tyndall fighters had intercepted the Learjet, and add those five minutes to the twenty minutes it took the Tyndall fighters to initially make contact with the Learjet, then add the remaining fifteen minutes it took the Eglin fighters to actually intercept the Learjet, that gives us an arrival/escort time of 09:18 CDT for the Eglin fighters, not 09:52 CDT as chronicled in the NTSB timeline. That is a thirty-four minute gap!
Is there any official account that would substantiate this thirty-four minute gap; that the Eglin fighters were escorting the Learjet thirty-four minutes earlier than the NTSB timeline admits to? As it happens there is. CNN.com on October 26th reported:
"An Air Force spokesman says two U.S. Air Force F-15s from Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, intercepted the plane shortly after it lost contact with aircraft controllers, and followed it to Missouri."7
The Air Force spokesman said the Eglin fighters intercepted the Learjet shortly after contact was lost with the aircraft. Well, one-hour and eighteen minutes doesn’t register with me as meaning shortly after!
So according to the Air Force timeline we have two interceptions of Payne Stewart’s Learjet before the NTSB chronicled 09:52 CDT interception. The first interception was by a pair of F-15s from Tyndall Air Force Base at approximately 08:58 CDT, with a second interception by Eglin fighters no later than 09:18 CDT, not 09:52 CDT as claimed by the NTSB.
In order to facilitate the Bush administration’s 2001 false flag attacks,8 the bureaucracy within the NTSB purposefully doctored their timeline of the Air Force’s response to Payne Stewart’s Learjet. Longer intercept times were needed in the Payne Stewart incident if the tardy NORAD response times on 9/11 were to be accepted by the public as nothing unusual. |
There seems to be a lot of stuff unravelling at present!! _________________ "The conflict between corporations and activists is that of narcolepsy versus remembrance. The corporations have money, power and influence. Our sole influence is public outrage. Extract from "Cloud Atlas (page 125) by David Mitchell. |
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