The Europe Controversy

[Rory Winter]

[Rory Winter]

APPEAL FOR FAIR REFERENDUMS
http://www.erc2.org/8.0.html

Supporters of the European Referendum Campaign agree to the following appeal:

You cannot build Europe without the consent of the people, that is why we direct the following demands to

* Heads of states and governments
* National parliaments
* the European Parliament:

1. The EU Reform Treaty must be submitted to the citizens in a referendum in each single EU member state.

2. If necessary the Parliaments of the EU member states must make the appropriate legal and constitutional provisions for a referendum.

3. A real and unbiased debate on the EU Constitution alias the Reform Treaty must be secured in the framework of a fair referendum.



Fair referendums allow both sides to present their points of view on the same conditions. We want a proper debate which deals with the real topic and brings Europe closer to the citizens.


Link


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[Rory Winter]

This essay by an Australian academic, though somewhat dry, is worth persevering through for those interested in how federalism enables a form of democratic decentralisation of power, something much superior to what exists in Britain or the Continent today.

So, far from 'bringing on a fascist state', a European Federation would recognise the pluralist nature of the many nation-states in Europe while providing a coherent umbrella of government where the power lies balanced between the sovereignty of each state government and the overall sovereignty of federal government.

That balance of powers would be similar to that which has existed for centuries in the USA and Professor Parkin makes similar comparisons with the federation that is the Commonwealth of Australia.

Rory
___________________________________________

Federalists can be democrats—and democrats ought to be federalists: a response to Maddox
http://tinyurl.com/6cltn5

Andrew Parkin, Professor of Political and International Studies at Flinders University and Editor of the Australian Journal of Political Science

Graham Maddox’s discussion paper for the Democratic Audit laments what he identifies as the anti-democratic character of federalism. Federalism, he tells us, is anti-democratic in an intrinsic sense because it is a system **of government explicitly designed to frustrate national majorities. In its Australian manifestation, he argues, it has amply demonstrated this quality, e.g. by constraining reform-minded national governments. For its American inventors, writes Maddox, ‘federalism was pitted against democracy’. As for the arguments of Australian defenders of federalism, he concludes, ‘any fair reading of [their] approach is to see democracy stood on its head’.[i]

Many contemporary European observers concerned about the democratic implications of recent political and constitutional change would probably be puzzled by this interpretation. Western Europe is well advanced down a track that seems to be heading towards strengthened European-level transnational institutions and processes of governance. Already achieved have been a common internal economic markets, a common currency, loosely coordinated foreign policies, a Europe-wide framework system of administrative and human-rights law, European legislative and executive institutions of government and so on. There is probably much to be said for this trajectory for its enhancement of values like international peace, economic efficiency and cross-cultural understanding. But for those Europeans for whom the over-riding value is democracy, there is scepticism—ranging from unease to alarm—about the ‘new Europe’. The label for this scepticism is revealing: it is a concern about a ‘democratic deficit’.[ii]

It should not be surprising that democrats—i.e. those who wish to enhance the capacity of political communities actively to engage in effective self-government—might be alarmed about excessive centralisation. Irrespective of how formally ‘democratic’ the institutions of a more unified Europe might be, there is good sense to the intuitive feelings of many Europeans that it is likely to create a more distant, less responsive, less participatory—i.e. less ‘democratic’—system.

There is, as some Europeans are now discerning, an intriguing alternative—a federal Europe.[iii] A federal Europe is what could conceivably emerge from a careful constitutional design that created an artful ‘democratic’ halfway house between unification and separation. Those contemplating a New Europe of this sort are engaging in some of the same thinking as those who contemplated a United States of America in the 1780s and those who contemplated a united Australia in the 1890s. They might, for strong democratic reasons, opt for the same federalist solution as did the Americans and the Australians. Other parts of the world—from Britain[iv] to Indonesia[v]—might well move in the same direction.

What sort of democracy is enhanced by good federal arrangements? Maddox is correct in regarding federalism as operating to weaken one particular version of the democratic vision: that of an unambiguously united ‘national’ people determining its collective future via the mechanism of winner-take all majoritarianism within a unitary state. But there are elements within that vision—the assumptions about national identity and unity, the notion of a singular collective future, the nature of winner-take-all politics—that trouble other democrats and which seem to ride roughshod over other coherent notions of democracy.

A federal system makes sense from a democratic perspective if the accepted notion of democracy places a high value on the following sorts of elements:

Identity. There seems to be an assumption in the Maddox perspective about the existence of a legitimate ‘national’ political community, underpinning an unproblematic match between national institutions and a national focus for citizen identity. There are indeed coherent theories about nationalism—i.e. about the expression of identification with or loyalty to a geographic entity at a ‘national’ level—and corresponding claims for self-governance put forward on the basis of so-called ‘national’ self-determination.

The relationship between nationalism in this sense, and democracy in some of its important senses, can however be rather fraught.[vi] But in any case, the same case for the recognition of affective claims about identity surely also work at a subnational level. In the case of a ‘new federal Europe’, these ‘subnational’ identities—e.g. the affective identities associated with the current array of sovereign nation-states—are obvious. In the Australian case, it happens that we also have an academic literature that seems to demonstrate the existence and persistence of legitimate subnational identifications, specifically with the States within the Australian federation.[vii]

‘Consociational’ democracy: If the ambit of ‘democracy’ is extended beyond national-level unitary winner-take-all majoritarianism to incorporate elements such as maximising involvement in decision-making and power-sharing among a wider range of interests within a political community, then we are entering the Lijphartean world of ‘consensus’ or ‘consociational’ democracy.[viii] Federalism is an institution that sits easily within a consociational vision of democracy. A case can be made that the political origin of Australian federalism was consociational in nature, with the Constitution as drafted and ratified in the 1890s embodying an unwillingness of the separate colonial communities to submerge their identities under a new national identity and insisting instead on a power-dispersing and power-sharing arrangement via the continuation of separate State-based democratic identities.

Accessibility: Federalism institutionalises a system of government predisposed to a more participatory and accessible mode of operation. It is potentially more participatory because the multiple levels or arenas of governance multiply the opportunities for meaningful citizen involvement in the political process. It is potentially more accessible because of the multiple access points opened up for citizen access to the governmental sphere. Studies of citizen-government interaction in Australia attest to the opportunities opened up in this way.[ix]

Policy packaging: Federalism’s system of multiple subnational governments allow individual States to create and dispense different packages of government-provided services at a different taxation/revenue costs. There are strongly entrenched pressures, via the separate constitutionally-protected political processes that define federalism, for the content and service/cost trade-off of each package to fit the aggregated preferences and interests of each State community. There is now considerable empirical evidence in the academic literature that Australian federalism does operate quite effectively along these lines to produce distinct State-based policy/service packages.[x]

Innovation: A multiplicity of competing governments allows for diversity, flexibility and experimentation in public policy. Because diverse constituencies are being served, different approaches might be attempted. Perceived policy successes can be emulated while perceived policy failures have afflicted only one State rather than the entire nation. Again, there is evidence in Australia of this sort of policy diffusion from innovative States.[xi]

Competitive responsiveness: Because State governments govern fixed geographically-defined jurisdictions whereas people and capital are potentially mobile, federalism predisposes competition among State governments for people and investment. Some critics of federalism dislike the competitive element in particular, but there are at least theoretical reasons for supposing that inter alia it might produce polities more responsive (in a quasi-market sense) to citizen preferences. There is a long tradition in the American political science literature which extols the virtue of decentralised government because it allows a sufficient number of mobile citizens to ‘vote with their feet’ and shift to the mini-polity which best matches their tax/service preferences, in the process instilling a competitive process between governments.[xii] Competition for both people and investment certainly takes place within the Australian federal system.[xiii]

These then are ‘democratic’ attributes likely to be enhanced by a federal system of government and likely to be weakened by a nationalist-majoritarian-unitary system. They are, it must be conceded, mostly predispositions and structurally-enhanced possibilities rather than guaranteed outcomes. There would be plenty of work ahead for a Democratic Audit that wished to investigate and document the extent to which the Australian federal system was actually working in the early 21st Century in furtherance of these attributes.

One plausible finding, for example, might be that the arrangements work tolerably well for the vast majority of Australians living in the State capitals (in other words, Australia’s characteristic population centralisation and governmental decentralisation are in this sense mutually supportive[xiv]). They may work less well for so-called ‘rural and regional Australia’: an Australian living in Armidale (for example) might understandably perceive Sydney to be as politically distant as Canberra.

An overlapping, though also conceptually separable, task would be to conduct Democratic Audits on each of the individual States. In everyday political life, residents of each Australian State (and, for practical purposes, those in the Northern Territory and the ACT as well) are engaged within a subnational polity with a governmental, political and policy system largely independent of any other polity. The morning metropolitan newspaper headlines and the evening television news clips routinely report the activities of the Premier, the decisions of the State Cabinet and the key debates within the State Parliament, as well as the local political issues and controversies—over economic development or school curricula or police services or prison reform or highway planning or a host of other matters—for which State governmental responsibility is recognised. That government is accountable to the citizens of the State (and to no others) through elections contested by political parties organised (for this purpose at least) at the State level. The State government is subject to the full gamut of locally-sourced political pressure—from the Parliamentary Opposition, from journalists and the media, from business lobbies, from trade unions and professional associations, from environmental organisations, from community activists, and from a whole host of other groups. The state of State-level democracy, so much more immediate and concerned with the real issues and services of everyday life than Commonwealth-level politics, needs to be a key element in any comprehensive audit of democracy in Australia.

In juxtaposition to the list of ‘democratic’ attributes enhanced by federalism, it would be possible to construct a counter-list of desirable attributes likely to be enhanced by nationalist-majoritarian-unitary arrangements and weakened by too much or a badly structured dispersal or devolution of authority. That counter-list would include—leaving aside the virtues, such as they may be, of national winner-take-all majoritarianism for its own sake—attributes like:

**national identity;

**enhanced governmental capacity (to the extent this follows from greater bulk and scale);

**such efficiencies as might be created or predisposed via scale and coordination;

**uniformity of entitlements and obligations across the whole national jurisdiction (to the extent that this is a virtue)

**importantly, an enhanced capacity for redistributive equalisation (though, equally, there would also be an enhanced capacity for redistribution in a regressive direction).

Federalism requires a Constitution setting out the respective powers of the various levels of government. Because constitutional design is thus intrinsic to the federalist project, there is the capacity in principle to construct a system within an appropriate balance between all of these elements. Meta-principles such as ‘subsidiarity’ might help in striking the right balance.[xv]

A Democratic Audit can legitimately assess whether that balance—our legacy from the constitutional designers of the 1890s and the constitutional tinkering of the 20th Century—is currently good enough in Australia. But at least, unlike Maddox, I not only regard this as an open, investigatable audit question but also as one likely to reveal and confirm the democratic virtues of the federal system.

Endnotes

References

Anderson, J. 1995. ‘ “Arrested federalization”? Europe, Britain, Ireland.’ In Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge, ed. G. Smith. London: Longman.

Birrell, R. 1995. A Nation of our Own: Citizenship and Nation-building in Federation Australia. Melbourne: Longman.

Boyce, B. 1993. ‘The democratic deficit in the European Community.’ Parliamentary Affairs 46(4): 458-77.

Burgess, M. 1996. ‘Introduction: federalism and the European Union.’ Publius 26(4): 1-14.

Canovan, M. 1996. ‘The Skeleton in the Cupboard: Nationhood, Patriotism and Limited Loyalties.’ In National Rights, International Obligations, eds S. Caney, D. George and P. Jones. Boulder: Westview Press.

Chappell, L. 2001. ‘Federalism and Social Policy: The Case of Domestic Violence.’ Australian Journal of Public Administration 60(1): 59-69.

Coultrap, J. ‘From parliamentarism to pluralism—models of democracy and the European Union’s “democratic deficit” ’. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(1): 107-35.

Denemark, D. and Sharman, C. 1994. ‘Political Efficacy, Involvement and Trust: Testing for Regional Political Culture in Australia.’ Australian Journal of Political Science 29(Special Issue): 81-102.

Dzur, A. 2002. ‘Nationalism, liberalism and democracy.’ Political Research Quarterly 55(1): 191-211.

Elazar, D. 1985. ‘Federalism and Consociational Regimes.’ Publius 15(2): 17-34.

Federal Union. 2002. Home page. <www.federalunion.yklinux.net/index.htm>.

Ferrazzi, G. 2000. ‘Using the “F” Word: Federalism in Indonesia’s Decentralization Discourse.’ Publius 30(2): 63-85.

Fletcher, C. 1999. ‘European Integration in the 21st Century.’ Discussion Paper no. 15. Darwin: Northern Australia Research Unit.

Follesdal, A. 1998. ‘Survey Article: Subsidiarity.’ Journal of Political Philosophy 6(2): 190-218.

Galligan, B. ed. 1988. Comparative State Policies. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Gerritsen, R. 1990. ‘A Continuing Confusion? A Comment on the Appropriate Dispersal of Policy Powers in the Australian Federation.’ Australian Journal of Political Science 25(2): 228-40.

Haseler, S. 1996. ‘Western Europe: a federal destiny?’ World Affairs 159(1): 37-41.

Henig, S. The uniting of Europe: From discord to concord. London: Routledge.

Hindess, B. 2002. ‘Deficit by Design.’ Australian Journal of Public Administration 61(1): 30-8.

Hix, S. 1998. ‘Elections, parties and institutional design: a comparative perspective on European Union democracy.’ West European Politics 21(3): 19-53.

Industry Commission. 1996. State, Territory and Local Government Assistance to Industry. Report 55. Canberra: AGPS.

Kasper, W. 1993. ‘Competitive Federalism: May the Best State Win.’ In Restoring the True Republic, eds G. Walker, S. Ratnapala and W. Kasper. Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies.

Keating, M. 1998. ‘Reforging the union: devolution and constitutional change in the United Kingdom’. Publius 28(1).

Kendle, J. 1997. Federal Britain: A History. London: Routledge.

Kincaid, J. 1999. ‘Confederal federalism and citizen representation in the European Union.’ West European Politics 22(2).

Lijphart, A. 1985. ‘Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories.’ Publius 15(2): 3-15.

Loughlin, J. 1996. ‘ “Europe of the Regions” and the federalization of Europe.’ Publius 26(4): 141-62.

MacCormick, N. 1996. ‘Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign State.’ Political Studies 44(3): 553-67.

Maddox, G. 2002. ‘Federalism and Democracy’. Discussion paper. Democratic Audit Website. Canberra: Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. <democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/MaddoxRev1Aug.rtf>.

McQueen, H. 1970. A New Britannia. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Miller, J.D.B. 1954. Australian Government and Politics. London: Duckworth.

Moravcsik, A. ‘In defence of the “democratic deficit”: reassessing legitimacy in the European Union.’ Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 603-24.

Nelson, H. 1985. ‘Policy Innovation in the Australian States.’ Politics 20(2): 77-88.

Nodia, G. 1994. ‘Nationalism and Democracy.’ In Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, eds L. Diamond and M. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Norris, P. 1997. ‘Special issue: Political representation in the European Parliament—Representation and the democratic deficit.’ European Journal of Political Research 32(2): 273-82.

Nunreither, K. 1994. ‘The democratic deficit of the European Union.’ Government and Opposition 29(3): 299-315.

Parkin, A. 1984. ‘The States and the Cities in Comparative Perspective.’ In Australian Urban Politics: Critical Perspectives, eds J. Halligan and C. Paris. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Parkin, A. 1996. ‘South Australia, Federalism and the 1990s: from cooperative to competitive reform.’ In South Australia, Federalism and Public Policy, ed. A. Parkin. Canberra: Federalism Research Centre, Australian National University.

Parkin, A. and Summers, J. 1996. ‘The States, South Australia and the Australian Federal System.’ In South Australia, Federalism and Public Policy, ed. A. Parkin. Canberra: Federalism Research Centre, Australian National University.

Peterson, J. 1994. ‘Subsidiarity: a definition to suit any vision?’ Parliamentary Affairs 47(1): 116-32.

Phelan, D. 1993. ‘Between the single market and the European Union.’ PS: Political Science and Politics 26(4): 732-6.

Pogge, T. 1997. ‘Creating supra-national institutions democratically: reflections on the European Union’s “democratic deficit” ’. Journal of Political Philosophy 5(2): 63-83.

Schmidt, V. ‘European “Federalism” and its Encroachment on National Institutions.’ Publius 29(1).

Sharman, C. 1990. ‘The Commonwealth, the States and Federalism.’ In Government, Politics and Power in Australia, 4th ed., eds J. Summers, D. Woodward and A. Parkin. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Smith, R. 2001. Australian Political Culture. Frenchs Forest: Longman.

Stradling, R., Newton, S. and Bates, D. eds 1997. Nationalism and Democracy in Modern Europe. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Tiebout, C. 1956. ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure.’ Journal of Political Economy 44: 416-35.

Wise, M. 2000. ‘From Atlantic arc to Atlantic area: a case of subsidiarity against the regions?’ Regional Studies 34(1).

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[i] Maddox (2002).

[ii] On the European debate about the ‘democratic deficit’, see e.g. Moravcsik (2002), Coultrap (1999), Hix (1998), Norris (1997), Pogge (1997), Nunreither (1994), Boyce (1993). See also Hindess (2002).

[iii] On the idea of a Federal Europe, see e.g. Federal Union (2002), Kincaid (1999), Schmidt (1999), Fletcher (1999), Henig (1997, esp. ch 9), Burgess (1996), Loughlin (1996), Haseler (1996), Anderson (1995).

[iv] See e.g. Keating (1998), Kendle (1997), Anderson (1995).

[v] See e.g. Ferrazzi (2000).

[vi] For various perspective on the relationship between nationalism and democracy, see e.g. Dzur (2002), Stradling, Newton and Bates (1997), Canovan (1996), Nodia (1994). On Australia in particular, see Birrell (9195), McQueen (1970).

[vii] See e.g. Miller (1954, 20), Sharman (1990), Denemark and Sharman (1994), Parkin and Summers (1996, 69-72), Smith (2001, ch 12).

[viii] See e.g. Lijphart (1985), Elazar (1985).

[ix] Gerritsen (1990).

[x] Galligan (1998).

[xi] Nelson (1985), Chappell (2001)

[xii] This is the so-called ‘Tiebout hypothesis’ derived initially from Tiebout (1956).

[xiii] On competitive federalism, see e.g. Kasper (1993), Industry Commission (1996), Parkin (1996).

[xiv] Parkin (1984), Parkin and Summers (1996, 70).

[xv] On the principle and practice of subsidiarity, see e.g. Wise (2000), Fletcher (1999), Follesdal (1998), MacCormick (1996), Peterson (1994)

[Rory Winter]

Although commenting on the Dutch and French rejection of the Constitution (was it as long ago now as 2005?!) Praful Bidwai's article from the Khaleej Times remains just as relevant to the Lisbon Treaty.

It highlights in clear terms why the Lisbon Treaty is unacceptable to democrats and why it is now so important for all Europeans to involve themselves in an evolutionary political struggle.

Apathy or disdain are no alternatives. Indeed they are the very weaknesses the rulers invite and encourage in order to defeat democracy.

Rory.
_____________________________________

The Vote for a Gentler and More Democratic Europe
Praful Bidwai, Khaleej Times, 5 June 2005
http://tinyurl.com/55vrtv

As the powerful impact of the emphatically negative French and Dutch verdicts in the referenda on the European Union's new Constitution sinks in, it becomes increasingly apparent that the vote may not have been driven largely by isolationism, national chauvinism or xenophobic fears about immigration, as many had expected.

These sentiments did form a significant (but minor) component of the reasons behind the ballot in the two countries. But the dominant consideration seems to have been just the opposite: the urge for a more democratic EU that respects, defends and extends its citizens' rights and strives for a humane common future for a Social Europe, which the conservative, pro-corporate Constitution would have negated.

It is equally apparent that the impact of the referenda, which render the Constitution null and void, will extend to the larger world beyond Europe. If a democratic debate now opens up, focused on the aims and purposes of the European project, it will pose major issues about whether and how the EU can contribute to a more balanced, equitable, non-hegemonic world order and provide a counterweight to the United States, or whether it would be content to be an emulator-competitor of the US on Washington's terms, and thus help further distort the global order. So all of us have a stake in the debate over Europe.

First, the 70 and 62 per cent turnouts respectively in France and the Netherlands mean that the EU seems important to its ordinary citizens and evokes strong emotions - not just of anger (at ruling governments and persistent unemployment), and fear (of a loss of identity), but also nobler ones like defence of humane values. These latter probably played a far more important role in the overall "no" vote. They certainly explain the success which the pro-integration Left and progressive social movements had in forming the core - and the coherent part - of the "no" coalition and in mobilising large numbers of people, including the youth, not to speak of fence-sitters at the last stage of the campaign.

The EU vote, especially in France, reflected a class divide. The upwardly mobile professionals voted "yes". But the working class, facing 10 per cent unemployment and grave economic uncertainty, rejected the "Europe of the Bosses".

The public debate generated by the Constitutional referenda has clearly reflected a conflict between two ideas: that of a kinder, gentler Europe, and a Europe that projects power and wants to dominate. There's a tussle here between two agendas: one of the people and social rights, and the other of "free markets" and corporate privilege.

The Constitution was basically dominated by the second agenda. The Convention which drafted it was established through nomination. It was mainly comprised of representatives of governments and national/European parliaments, and generally excluded civil society organisations. This was in keeping with the EU's evolution in recent years, especially after the elitist Maastricht treaty.

The Constitution is an unwieldy 400-page-plus document, with 448 articles. Very, very few people have read it. Nor has the media summed up its provisions accurately or fully. The Constitution is almost impossible to amend. Any change requires a consensus at three levels virtually impossible to achieve. It perpetuates top-heavy structures like the democratically unaccountable European Central Bank. It would also have created an individual EU president with a term of 30 months in place of the more democratic six-month rotating presidency.

Similarly, by amending the consensus rule, under which all EU decisions had to be unanimous in the 25 member-states, it gives excessive powers to the Big Four (Germany, France, Britain and Italy) and discriminates against smaller states by stipulating a majority of only 65 per cent of citizens and 55 per cent of states.

The statute erodes the democratic decision-making space on immigration and social policy and grants the veto to national parliaments only for defence, foreign policy and taxation. The emphasis, however, is on a common foreign and security policy. An especially egregious feature of the Constitution is that it contains policy prescriptions especially "free market" dogmas. Policy is a legitimate function of the government of the day, not the Constitution.

The Constitution subordinates hard-won social rights to so-called free competition, and treats corporate interests as sacrosanct. For instance, it whittles down the fundamental right to work, to the right to look for a job! It removes valuable social protections. And it mandates that public services like water supply, healthcare and education be thrown open to "competition" and thus be privatised. The Constitution would have completed and sealed the long under-way transition from social Europe to corporate Europe.

At a seminar in Amsterdam, which I attended, Susan George, the famed author of How the Other Half Dies noted that the word "competition" occurs 47 times in the text. While "market" occurs 78 times, "social progress" is completely missing!

Equally disturbing is the obligation of each member state to "improve its military capabilities". The EU, which spends half as much as the US on the military (in GDP terms) is being asked to compete with America and match its spending on military research too.

A related EU defence strategy paper calls for military "intervention anywhere", which is "early, rapid, and when necessary, robust". It says: "We should be ready to act before a crisis occurs." This is similar to the obnoxious Bush doctrine of pre-emptive/preventive war!

The ultimate irrationality is that the EU's new militaristic orientation is unrelated to any external threat!

The Constitution's defeat precipitates a fresh crisis. This can be resolved only by deciding one central issue: what kind of Europe is desirable - an arrogant, powerful superpower unkind to its own citizens, or a federal entity that respects equality, caring-and-sharing and justice, and wants to reform the iniquitous world order?

We can only hope that such a debate gets going soon and that the EU emerges as a genuine alternative model to the hegemonic American one. Only thus can it live up to its original promise of creating an order where nations don't go to war, execute people or subject them to the market's brutalities.

Copyright 2005 Khaleej Times

[Rory Winter]

First minister accuses UK of ‘campaign of aggression’
Salmond hits out as poll backs breakaway
By Katrine Bussey
http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/587382
14/04/2008

First Minister Alex Salmond has launched a ferocious attack on the UK Government – as a poll showed that support for an independent Scotland has taken a narrow lead over backing for the union.

The Gordon MSP accused Labour rivals at Westminster of running a “campaign of aggression” against his SNP administration at Holyrood.

And he claimed that the behaviour of “bullies” in the UK Government would only lead to increased calls for Scotland to break away.

Mr Salmond – who is also MP for Banff and Buchan – has been accused by Scotland Secretary Des Browne of manufacturing rows between the two governments.

But the first minister said: “The more Westminster tries to lay down the law north of the border in clearly devolved areas, the greater the support will be for independence.

“Bullies always get their comeuppance.

“Whoever is running London Labour’s campaign of aggression against the Scottish Government, one thing is clear – it isn’t anyone based in Scotland, or with a scintilla of understanding of Scotland.

“Ten years on from the height of New Labour’s power under Tony Blair, this latest campaign is a sad effort at control freakery.”

Mr Salmond also claimed that New Labour in Scotland was “in its death throes”.

He said: “Labour is trying and failing to exert the iron grip it once had and took for granted, and is totally uncomprehending of the loss of power and the new political reality it finds itself in.

“Independence would give us a voice and votes in the European Union, where we have many vital interests at stake, and also enable us to act on our instincts for internationalism, emulating the success of other small countries, such as Ireland and Scandinavian nations.

“By opposing independence, the unionist parties demonstrate a poverty of vision for Scotland.”

But Labour leader Wendy Alexander insisted that a “steady majority” of Scots rejected this.

She argued that Scotland still benefits from the union and said “all the available evidence” indicated that. even when oil prices were high, an independent Scotland would struggle to maintain existing levels of public services.

Ms Alexander claimed: “The people of Scotland know that in any partnership there will be good times and bad times. And when one partner is down, the others reach out a helping hand.

“Throughout the three centuries of the United Kingdom partnership, this has been the case and the reason why it has survived and prospered.”

Devolution allowed Scots to “step out of the shadow of our bigger sister while benefiting from the uniqueness of our UK relationship”.

She added: “Scots do not want to walk out of the union, but they do want to walk tall within the union.”

However, a new poll found 41% of Scots want SNP ministers to negotiate an independence settlement, compared to 40% who oppose breaking up the UK.

The poll was based on the SNP’s favoured referendum question, which is whether the Scottish Government should negotiate a settlement for an independent state.

Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said: “The poll is further and dramatic evidence that as the SNP delivers good government in the devolved areas, so support for Scotland to be governed equally well in all areas with independence is soaring.

“Labour’s London-based aggressive and negative campaign is getting a strong reaction in Scotland. People want a government that will speak up for Scotland – not shut up for London.

“It is a tremendous boost for the SNP in the run-up to our conference next week.”

[Rory Winter]

A voice for a different Europe
Interview with Susan George
An Phoblacht (The Republic), 24 December 2007
http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?&act_id=17744

The defeated EU Constitution has been repackaged as the Reform Treaty, which does not say a single word about social Europe. Rejecting it is crucial to save democracy.

EOIN Ó BROIN speaks to writer and social activist SUSAN GEORGE about how important the Irish referendum on the EU Treaty is for democrats and progressives across Europe. With her satirical political novel, The Lugano Report, acclaimed by no lesser figures than Noam Chomsky, John Pilger and George Monbiot, Susan George’s is a voice that should be heard.

“IT MAKES me feel as though I have been spat on. It makes me feel that they have nothing but contempt for the voters. It is as if we didn’t vote, our votes don’t count, our opinions don’t count and we are being told, ‘Just shut up and let the technocrats get on with it.’”

Susan George is not known to exaggerate. Her writing is careful and considered, well-researched and internationally respected. But the decision to repackage the defeated EU Constitution as the Reform Treaty has angered her. She feels “spat on”. That people in France will be denied the right to vote on the new treaty indicates, in her opinion, that EU political elites “have nothing but contempt for the voters”. Of course, she is “not totally surprised” because in, her view, “the EU is not a democratic organisation”.

Invited to Dublin by the Campaign Against the EU Constitution, Susan George spoke to a meeting of political activists in Liberty Hall in November. The meeting was the first in a series of events being organised by the campaign to highlight their concerns about the content of the Treaty and its implications for Ireland and the EU.

Although maybe not a household name in Ireland, Susan George is well-known in political and academic circles across the world. For three decades she has written and campaigned on issues of debt, global poverty, environmental protection and neo-liberalism.

Greenpeace International

From 1990 to 1994, George sat on the board of Greenpeace International. From 1999 to 2006 she was-vice president of ATTAC France (Association for Taxation of Financial Transaction to Aid Citizens). ATTAC promotes the taxation of international financial transactions in order to curb stock market speculation and provide revenue for development projects in the developing world.

She is currently chair of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam, an international network of writers whose work seeks to contribute to social justice and who are active in various social movements.

Author of 14 books, translated into many languages, Susan George is best-known for her ground-breaking studies of global poverty, food insecurity and the impact of debt on the developing world. Since the publication of How The Other Half Dies (1976), she has been a trenchant critic of the policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. More recently she has focused much of her attention on the World Trade Organisation and the impact of trade liberalisation on the world’s poor.

John Pilger described her 2003 book, The Lugano Report, as “an extraordinary, original book of exquisite irony, a kind of Catch-22 of capitalism”. Noam Chomsky said, “with acid wit and sombre truths, The Lugano Report brilliantly portrays, through the eyes of its imagined but all too realistic planners, a world that may be heading for deep trouble”. George Monbiot described the report as “a brilliant and innovative means of exposing a world order that serves only the strongest. A compelling satire, packed with information, this is the work of an author in complete control of her subject.”

The EU Constitution

In 2004, ATTAC France took a decision to oppose the EU Constitution. In their view, the treaty was promoting neo-liberalism, poverty, insecurity and mass-unemployment. On 29 May 2005, in the biggest ever turn-out for an EU-related poll, 55 per cent of French voters rejected the EU Constitution. The 70 per cent turn-out was in sharp contrast to the 45 per cent turn-out for the 2004 European parliamentary elections.

As vice-president of ATTAC France, Susan George played a central part in the campaign. Opinion polls had been indicating for some time that the ‘No’ side was gaining ground. There was widespread shock across Europe that France, one of the union’s founding members, rejected the Treaty. George explains the result as a consequence of “the spirit of the French Revolution”.

“It seemed to me to be in the long line of French movements on the left for human emancipation. Once people actually found out what was in the treaty it was quite natural to vote ‘No.’”

The French said ‘No’ because the treaty was “a blueprint for neo-liberal economics and privatisation, giving no protection to public services and very little protection for the environment”.

The Reform Treaty

Following the rejection of the treaty by the French and then the Dutch, the European Commission announced a “period of reflection”. Eighteen months later, the Council of Europe agreed the Reform Treaty, containing 96 per cent of the articles of the EU Constitution. George believes that, during the intervening period:

“The European Council and Commission were trying to figure out the best way to mask the fact that they were going to try and shove the same thing down our throats. You can’t just say that the French and the Dutch voted wrong so we’re going to hand them the same text again. They had to find a way to hide what they were doing.”

That the Reform Treaty is almost identical to the EU Constitution is not in doubt. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, speaking to the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in July 2007, said:

“In terms of content, the proposals remain largely unchanged – they are simply presented in a different way.” Giscard d’Estaing, former President of France, was chair of the convention that drew up the Constitution.

As a life-long campaigner for trade justice, George is particularly concerned about the implications of the Reform Treaty for the developing world.

“The relationship between developed Europe and the global south is going to be profoundly changed,” she believes. Articles promoting unfettered international trade and transferring power for international trade negotiations to the EU “would enable the EU to push through exactly the kind of treaty that Peter Mandleson is negotiating right now with the African Caribbean and Pacific Countries, 78 of the poorest countries of the world”. The European Commission agenda of seeking to open up developing world markets to European corporations, irrespective of the impact of such policies on the world’s poor would be strengthened if the Reform Treaty is passed.

“The EU will use these new powers in the Reform Treaty to do exactly what he pleases,” says George, “and people from Trócaire and other development organisations can complain all they like to the Irish Government but the Irish Government is not going to be able to do anything about it.”

George is also dismissive of those who argue that the Reform Treaty is Europe’s best hope of defending the gains of Social Europe in the face of globalisation. “I don’t see how anybody can argue that,” George says in exasperation. “There is not a single word about Social Europe in the Treaty. On the contrary, this is a treaty to enrich the elites further. It is a treaty that is going to continue to crush democracy. And it is a treaty that is going to break down the capacity of the state to provide for its citizens.”

George contends that the motivations behind the drafters of the treaty are best summarised by liberal economist Adam Smith’s famous phrase: “All for ourselves and nothing for other people.”

Despite strong opposition to the Reform Treaty, Susan George cannot be described as anti-European. In her 2004 book, Another World is Possible If... she argued the case for a strengthened Social Europe as a global counterweight to US-led corporate globalisation and militarisation.

Rejecting the Reform Treaty for George is a crucial aspect of her alternative.

“I want to open up some space. We have to keep saying no until they get the point and we can sit down and have a real discussion about the future of Europe, one which would include electing a convention which would draft a new treaty but only after a lot of debate.”

She adds:

“Europe ought to be an alternative model to the United States, promoting social solidarity, human development and peace.”

With opinion polls indicating that 62 per cent of the Southern Irish electorate is undecided on the Reform Treaty, Susan George’s arguments are a reminder that opposition to the EU and opposition to the Reform Treaty are not the same thing.

• Susan George’s new books, We The Peoples of Europe (Pluto) and Culture in Chains: How the Religious and Secular Right Captured America (Polity), will be published in 2008.

An Phoblacht

[Rory Winter]

Tweedledum & Tweedledee in the Great British Non-Debate
http://tinyurl.com/5peya9

Nowhere in Europe can the issue of Europe have become so polarised as it has in Britain. Yet the issue of a Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty has been confused (and I suspect deliberately so) with the question of whether Britain should remain or withdraw from the EU.

Whereas there is a strong outcry for a Referendum in certain quarters the prospect of withdrawal remains much less popular. Britain's anti-EU campaigners know this and seek to cloud the issue by using the call for a Referendum as proof of the unpopularity of the EU. It's no accident that anti-EU newspapers like the Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph are all the most vociferous when it comes to demanding a Referendum. And David Cameron's Tory Party, not known for its love of things European, is no different.

During the recent House of Commons debate on the Lisbon Treaty it was significantly the Tories who felt threatened by the prospect of a European Defence Force which they see as a threat to the present Anglo-American 'special relationship' and alliance. Cameron claims that the 'special relationship' is in his and the Tory party's DNA. It shouldn't take much analysis to understand what he means.

And whereas it is perfectly understandable that writers like Susan George should denounce the Treaty as a blueprint for 'neo-liberal' exploitation and for the people of France and Holland to have rejected the proposed Constitution for similar reasons we should be much more cautious with the British Right as well as the caravan of anti-EU nationalists which follows on behind it.

A major reason the British Right is fighting the Lisbon Treaty is because it sees the creation of a European Defence Force as the first step towards a military bloc which would seriously challenge not only the present Anglo-Saxon Alliance but the imperialist military power behind it.


Now Eire is under threat from Nato

When reminded of the paradox in their 'independence' argument the anti-EU nationalists have no answer. For how can they really be serious about a British 'independence' which in the cruel light of day simply does not exist? And if the nationalists on the Left are, as they often profess to be, anti-Nato and against the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan how can they square this with their hostility to a EU which is feared by US analysts as a growing threat to US foreign policy?

Opposition to the EU in Britain tends to come from a deeper source of resentment than just concern for the threat of unemployment resulting from the Treaty's 'neoliberal' economic policies. It is something to be found in the well-springs of national identity or now rather a lack of one following a post-imperial hangover. It is probably no accident that there exists no serious interest here in a debate about the need for more democracy within the EU. Why bother when you can get your opinions ready-made from the Sun? And yet how many who read the Sun know that Rupert Murdoch, a naturalised US citizen, is a mortal enemy of the EU? And if they did would they trouble to join up the dots?

Unlike Eire with its Dublin Castle Forum debate the people of the UK are not being allowed any debate over the Lisbon Treaty. The British must rely on the paucity of --even then grossly distorted-- information it receives from the national mainstream media and a government whose attitude to the European Project is in a word ambivalent. While on the one hand successfully blackmailing the EU with threats to veto the Treaty if not allowed major opt-outs concerning industrial relations and civil rights Gordon Brown returns to our shores claiming these opt-outs to be an "achievement"! An achievement for whom, the people or a reactionary government going busily about turning Britain into a police-state?

There never was a time when Britain more needed an intelligent, informed national debate about where this country is headed for. But that need is not even on the agenda of an unelected Brown government whose deeply undemocratic nature makes even the Tories look like the champions of freedom. Of course, they are not. If Labour and the Tories have one thing in common it is that they share a deep belief in the Atlantic alliance between Britain and the USA.

That Alliance, while in the interests of Anglo-American capital, is certainly no friend of the people. Both Labour and the Tories would like to keep Britain in the EU to act as a trojan horse for US interests and interventionism. And that is why Tweedledum and Tweedledee do not want a national debate on Europe or, indeed, anything else.

While campaigning for a more democratic Europe the reality of the Anglo-American status quo should never be forgotten. What European democrats should be working towards is not only a decentralised and democratic European Federation --one that is truly people-friendly-- but for a Europe that has the economic, diplomatic and military teeth to present itself as a defensive counter-force in a new, multipolar world of powers.

Paul Carline from the Initiative & Referendum Institute, Marburg comments:

An excellent analysis. There are very good reasons for believing that a federated Europe based on popular sovereignty and direct-democratic rights (citizen-initiated referendums and obligatory referendums on key issues - as is already the case in the Irish Republic) would be a safer and more prosperous place.

There’s every reason to think that Britain would also be better off as a federal country, like Switzerland and Germany.

In fact, Switzerland, with its 26 sovereign cantons, each with its own constitution based on popular sovereignty, is a great model for an EU which now has 27 member states.
Academic studies in Switzerland show that the more direct democracy there is i.e. the more the people have real rights of political decision-making and initiative, the happier people are and the more efficient and prosperous the economy is.

When anti-EU people speak of ‘national sovereignty’, they are talking about an undemocratic claim to exclusive power by an unrepresentative parliament and government in which a tiny handful of people around the prime minister can take momentous decisions such as committing Britain to illegal wars (incidentally making those who promoted and supported those decisions war criminals in international and domestic law. cf. the Campaign to Make Wars History at www.makewarshistory.org).

Is that the kind of sovereignty we want?

[Rory Winter]

Of things Fascist

It has been suggested elsewhere on this forum that I have sought to undermine an ongoing discussion that the EU is a fascist organization (sic). Any intelligent reader would see this allegation to be nonsense.

My purpose for having started this particular thread, The Europe Controversy, was precisely in order to provide a safe place for discussion of this topic where all views would be welcome to be discussed in a civilised and intelligent manner without pointless invective.

The fact that the anti-EU people have chosen not to participate is something that is clearly beyond my control. They should, however, be reminded that they are welcome to discuss the subject here in a reasonable and rational manner.

If a person does not have the courage of their convictions and is therefore unable to argue their position that is their problem. It is not the fault of those who might continue to put forth an opposing view. A forum is a place for an exchange of views and ideas. It is not a pulpit from which to preach to the converted.

Readers should be reminded that this thread was begun in response to a series of threats that any view of the EU other than it to be a fascist one would be summarily removed. That attitude was not only intolerably dictatorial but put the image of the 911 Truth Forum as a place of free and fair discussion into disrepute.

Finally, may I add that if there were any threats of fascism they came from an entirely domestic source and certainly not from the EU!

[Rory Winter]

The Case for Cornwall
http://bellacaledonia.wordpress.com/2008/04/03/the-case-for-cornwall/# more-46

“Britain* is divided into four parts; whereof one is inhabited by Englishmen, the other by Scots, the third by Welshmen, and the fourth by Cornish people, which all differ among themselves, either in tongue, either in manners, or else in laws and ordinances.”

– Polydore Vergil (Henry VIII’s geographer)

What is it with the London media? It seems if you email celebrity chefs like Rick Stein and the mockney Jamie Oliver calling yourself “CNLA” and promising a “rosy glow” in their pricey restaurants in Cornwall, you can get coverage in a dozen newspapers, whereas if you manage to collect 50,000 signatures for a Cornish Assembly in two years, you get none. Bear in mind that the Cornish population is only 400,000, and the petition was badly publicised, and you can see the scale of feeling. Cornwall, meantime, has the lowest GDP in the UK, at a mere 62% of the average. An article in the Western Morning News has pointed out “in places like Mousehole, Port Isaac & Cadgwith, it is possible to buy any number of £1000 paintings, but not a pint of milk” thanks to the vast number of second homes there. Rick Stein is part of the problem, and has led to Padstow being nicknamed Padstein, thanks to buying up half the town. Would Stein or Oliver agree with this?

“We, the people of Cornwall, must have a greater say in how we are governed. We need a Cornish Assembly that can set the right democratic priorities for Cornwall, and provide a stronger voice for our communities in Britain, in Europe, and throughout the wider world.”

Most Scots don’t know that Cornwall is not a proper part of England. For centuries, a significant number of its natives have always regarded themselves as non-English, and it is the only “English county” with its own language, laws and nationalist movement. For example, if you die without a will in England, your property goes to the Crown. In Cornwall it goes to the Duke of Cornwall (Prince Charles), and the Duchy has been used more or less as an expense account for the heir to the throne. The story of the decline of Cornish mining, farming and fishing is one with which Scots have first hand experience.



In the post-Roman period, the Cornish were known as “West Welsh” by the English. (“Welsh” being an old English word for “foreigner”). This was retained in Cornwall which means “Welsh Headland”. Cornwall only became joined, bit by bit, in the Norman period. Even so, during the Middle Ages, the phrase “England and Cornwall” turns up in dozens of medieval documents, including the Magna Carta. Henry VIII’s coronation lists his realms as including “ England, France…Cornwall, Wales & Ireland”. The Cornish would rise repeatedly, notably in 1497 under Michael An Gof who raised an army of 15,000.

The Reformation was particularly painful for the Cornish. When the English language Book of Common Prayer was forced on them, they rose in 1549, complaining partly that many of them spoke no English. The upper class converted to Anglicanism, or was dispossessed, but the vast majority of the Cornish peasantry and working class did not “conform”. Even today, Methodism is far bigger than Anglicanism in Cornwall. As in Wales, Cornish radicalism arose from Methodism, and joined the Liberal Party. However, unlike elsewhere, the Cornish radicals did not really take to the Labour party. The battle in Cornwall has been traditionally between Tories and Liberals. This changed however, in 1997, when Cornwall, Wales and Scotland all became Tory-free.

“The Cornish are fortunate in being able to paint their regional [sic] discontents in the attractive colours of the Celtic tradition. Merseyside cannot blow a national trumpet, Cornwall can.” – Eric Hobsbawm

Although much of modern Cornish nationalism originated in bourgeois Romanticism, by the present day, it has come to embrace the entire political spectrum, both republican and monarchist, liberal and conservative, socialist and social democrat. The Lib Dems continue to flirt with it, with the most “nationalist” Lib Dem being Andrew George MP, who took his oath in Cornish. The real voice, other than the defunct Cornish National Party, is Mebyon Kernow, which tends to left of centre. MK has some claims to fame – it participates fully in the local CND and Green campaigns, has engaged in industrial action, and prevented nuclear power stations from being built. It does very well in council elections, but not in Westminster elections. This is partly because it is not entitled to broadcasts, and receives little publicity in local press. While not achieving the levels of Plaid, or the SNP, MK has more councillors in Cornwall, than UKIP has anywhere, and got more council votes than Labour in Cornwall.

While London-based TV portrays Cornwall as a playground of the rich, surfing, pirates and yokels, based in “South West England”, the reality is a housing crisis, high unemployment, and a rapid brain drain. Coupled with a thousand years of cultural aggression and assimilation, it’s no wonder Cornwall, Cornish and the Cornish are in such a bad way. Some have started to become “Cornish and English”, in a similar fashion to Rangers fans who wear England shirts.

“Smaller minorities also have equally proud visions of themselves as irreducibly Welsh, Irish, Manx or Cornish. These identities are distinctly national in ways which proud people from Yorkshire, much less proud people from Berkshire will never know. Any new constitutional settlement which ignores these factors will be built on uneven ground.” (The Guardian, editorial, 8th May 1990)

Concessions are few, and have come slowly to Cornwall. For example, the Rose has been removed from Cornish road signs, and replaced with the Cornish flag after a direct action campaign. The Cornish language is reappearing, and the national flag is now everywhere. Cornish devolution and investment has not come, instead London links Cornwall into “Devonwall” and jobs are exported eastward to Plymouth and Exeter. Cornwall is also refused European aid, thanks to the government. In 1967, the Liberal MPs, John Pardoe and Peter Bessel complained, “the Cornish people have the same right to control their country, its economy and its political future as the other Celtic peoples of Scotland and Wales.”

Four decades later, Cornish Lib Dems make the same complaint, while the party in London says the exact opposite. When will Cornwall be heard?

by Ray Bell

* The original “British” are the Welsh, Cornish and Bretons. However, there is little connection between the ancient term, and the modern one, which is co-opted and political.

[Rory Winter]

On the Anti-semitism that led to Two Holocausts, Past & Present


Shock & Awe Holocaust

While I do not wish, in any way, to belittle the Shoa or Holocaust of the 1940s I am amazed at the way the more recent Muslim Holocaust (1991 to the present) is --and I am tempted to say wilfully-- ignored by even those who might consider themselves to be liberals, of the left or of the anti-war movement. It isn't as if the figures to prove that Holocaust are not there. The Australian scientist, academic, lecturer, writer, author and artist, Dr Gideon Polya published these figures almost a year ago and his web-article is available at http://www.nineeleven.co.uk/board/viewtopic.php?t=11670

Dr Polya has also published a huge pharmacological text entitled Biochemical Targets of Plant Bioactive Compounds. A pharmacological reference guide to sites of action and biological effects (London & New York). He previously published a detailed book entitled Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History. Colonial rapacity, holocaust denial and the crisis in biological sustainability (Melbourne, 1998).

The latter dealt with the 2-century atrocity of British rule over India culminating in the man-made Bengal Famine of 1943/44 that killed 4 million people but which has been largely deleted from British histriography in a continuing process of sustained, racist, holocaust denial. His most recent book, Body Count, documents the similarly non-reported avoidable death of 1.3 billion people since 1950 on Spaceship Earth with the First World in control of the flight deck --for further details of Body Count, see http://globalbodycount.blogspot.com

Why is it then that the West is so obsessed with events that took place over half a century ago while it blocks out the reality of what is going on right now before us & as this post is being written? I would maintain that in both cases it is because the First World or what preceded it in Europe remains stubbornly in denial of its anti-semitic past as well as the new anti-semitism it practises against the Muslim world.

At an extreme level we can see this caricatured in the traditionally anti-semitic, racist BNP allying itself with a Jewish Zionist in the hope of attracting Jewish votes! The new tactic of the opportunist BNP, it appears, is no longer an anti-semitism levelled at Jews but of one against Muslims. While at one level this appears to be totally opportunistic at another it gives us a fascinating if not horrific insight into the darker corners of the European psyche in which the racial memories of persecution against both Jews and Muslims remains embedded.


Crusading against the Antichrist

Europe has never really owned the huge karmic debt it created for itself in what we appropriately call the Dark Ages. As a result, it was condemned to relive those horrors, first through the Holocaust of the Nazis and now the Holocaust committed by the Anglo-Saxon Alliance, the new Nazis, against that other semitic people the Iraqis and the partly-semitic people of Afghanistan. Somewhere in the European mind a myth was formed centuries ago of the crusading Christian who would prevail over the shifty and usurious Jew as well as the fanatical Mohammedan.

Hitler constantly used the first caricature and described himself as a Christian doing the work of the Lord. How different was his claim to the one we hear from today's Christian Zionists who seek to pressure US Presidents to attack Iran and bring on a final, nuclear Armageddon? And both the current US and UK governments have carried out a calculated and sustained campaign ever since the fabricated 911 incident to demonise, scapegoat and terrorise Muslims as fanatics and devils.

None of this, I believe, could have been possible if it were not for the Myth of the Crusading Christ that runs so deeply in the psyche of the Anglo-American and primarily Protestant mind. The psychiatrist, Carl Gustav Jung, argued that the everyday lives of humans have always been governed by one or another form of Myth. Myths, he said, are important symbols of meaning to the human psyche. Without acknowledging the importance of that inner world, men would find themselves empty of meaning. Something else would fill the vacuum which had been previously filled by the old myths. He warned that that was happening with the growth of fascism and the new myth of the strongman Dictator.

But it is interesting that even the strongman Dictators found themselves having to cash-in on the popular Christian myth that turns the Jew into the Antichrist by blaming Christ's death on the Cross on the Jews! Basically the same myth that Sacha Baron Cohen alludes to while singing his outrageous song, Throw the Jew down the Well, to gullible American rednecks. Anti-semitism against both Jews and Muslims dwells deep down in the Anglo-American and European psyche.


Two Sociopaths of a Kind

The current political correctness over the Shoa Holocaust originates in the feelings of guilt that Europeans still collectively feel about the brutal reality of where that anti-semitism led them to sixty years ago. It was easy enough to blame it all on the Germans, a defeated nation. And especially so as it was an Austrian that the Germans had allowed to lead them into the Nightmare. But before the coming of Hitler, German anti-semitism was really no different in nature to European anti-semitism in general, including that of Britain, immortalised in Shakespeare's evil Shylock and past pogroms.

The great irony is that while it is now politically correct to genuflect in atonement of their past sins against the Jewish people, Anglo-Americans project their inner guilt by murdering millions of those other semites, the Muslims, while at the same time seeking to revile and demonise them as terrorists and criminals! In tribal wars you have to do this. You have to justify your lust for murder by blaming it all on the evils of those you are just about to murder. The Zionists, on the other hand, seem to have no problems working with today's anti-semites. Why should they after having worked so closely with Hitler before?

It is totally understandable that the children of the victims of the Shoa should never forget how their parents and grandparents were murdered in the name of some absurd political dogma. But it is equally understandable that the relatives (if there are any left) of the eight million Muslims who died during the Anglo-Saxon coalition's Shock and Awe tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan should feel the same. The West rightly tried and punished earlier war criminals who happened also to be on the defeated side. How long, I wonder, and under what circumstances of a required defeat will it be before the war criminals of the West are similarly tried and punished?